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This thesis examines the right-to-now provision (Article II, Sec. 9)
of the M ontana Constitution, including its roots in political theory
since the 18th century, the drafting of the provision during the
state's 1970-71 Constitutional Convention, and how the provision has
been considered and interpreted by the M ontana Supreme Court
since the Constitution was ratified in 1972.
Primary research sources were philosophers and political theorists,
beginning with John Locke, who helped develop modern democratic
theory; the verbatim transcripts of the M ontana C onstitutional
Convention; numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases that dealt with free
speech issues; several law review articles concerning a right of access
to government-held information; and most of the Montana Supreme
Court cases that involved the right-to-know provision.
This thesis concludes that the right to know remains undeveloped
and murky as a doctrine in Montana law, and that the constitutional
provision has received only a modicum of support from the state
Supreme Court in the two-plus decades since it was ratified.
In
many cases, the court has found ample reasons to circum vent or
even diminish the right to know.
A right to know is not found in most state constitutions or in the
U.S. C onstitution, but the concept has deep roots in dem ocratic
theory. Political theorists as far back as Locke and John Stuart Mill
drew parallels between the importance of free speech and value of
searching for truth.
M odern-da^ writers and thinkers like John
Rawls and Alexander Meiklejohn articulated their own theories about
how the free flow of information was essential to a functional
democracy. The framers of the Montana Constitution, fearing that
expanding governm ental pow er would dim inish the ro le of
individuals in public affairs, argued that this constitutional provision
would serve as a check on government's abuse of its power.
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I n tr o d u c tio n

Under the com pact upon which the
Constitution rests, it is agreed that men
shall not be governed by others, that they
shall govern themselves . . . . The primary
purpose of the First Amendment is, then,
that all the citizens shall, so far as possible,
u n d ersta n d
issu es
w hich
bear
upon
common life. That is why no idea, no doubt,
no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant
information, may be kept from them .1

Alexander Meiklejohn

No person shall be deprived of the
right to examine documents or to observe
the deliberations of all public bodies or
agencies of state governm ent and its
subdivisions, except in cases in which the
dem and of in d iv id u al privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.

Art. II, Sec. 9, Montana Constitution

The right to

know

was a new provision

C onstitution when it was ratified in

in

the

M ontana

1972. Its explicit language

M eiklejohn, Alexander, Free Speech and its Relation to SelfG overnm ent. (N.Y. 1960) p. 75.
1

2
protecting citizens' rights to information about their government was
bold and unusual.

The wording is clear and clean, and includes only

one exception: The privacy rights of individuals, when clearly more
important than the public’s right to know, can override the right to
know .
The rationale for this constitutional provision grew, in part, out
of Montana citizens’ healthy suspicion of government, best expressed
perhaps by a sentence introducing the state Open Meetings law in
Montana Code: “The people of the state do not wish to abdicate their
sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.”2
The constitutional status of a specific right to know is
relatively

new

to

M ontana law, but the concept

is

as

old

as

dem ocratic theory itself, drawing upon centuries of thought about
government in a free society.
From the 17th century, John Locke, John Stuart Mill,
M adison

and others built the framework for modern

James

democracy;

these men believed that an uneducated society was incapable of
governing itself. They believed in free speech because it was the key
to an educated citizenry. To them,

ignorance was antithetical to

freedom. Madison, who drafted the First Amendm ent to the U.S.
Constitution, believed the right to seek knowledge was inherent in
the right to free speech.
“(A) popular government, without popular inform ation, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or
perhaps both,” he wrote in 1822. “Knowledge m ust forever govern

2M ontana Code Annotated 2-3-201.

ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must
arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives.”3
M odern

political

theorists

like

A lexander

M eiklejohn,

who

wrote extensively about free speech in the first part of this century,
and Harvard University Professor John

Rawls, also

have promoted

the right to know as a corollary to free speech. “All

citizens should

have the means to be informed about political issues,” Rawls wrote in
A Theory of Justice published in 1971.4
But the words "right to know" or any similar expressions don't
appear
has

in the text of the U.S. Constitution,

left judges

and

scholars

arguing

a fact that for 200 years
about

w hether

the

First

Amendment itself, or any other passages in the Constitution, gives
citizens a right of access to government secrets.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, for example, in
an analysis of free speech protections, rebuked those who claimed to
find a

right of access to government-held information in the text of

the U .S.

Constitution.

Asserting

such

a right is

simply

“fuzzy

thinking,” Stewart said.5
But others disagree. A scattering of court rulings over the years
have supported the right to know, with some judges arguing, as did
Mill, Madison and Meiklejohn, that access to government information

3The Writings of James Madison. (G. Hunt ed. 1910) letter from
James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822).
4Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.) p. 225.
5Justice Potter Stewart (retired), The Constitution: That Delicate
B alance (Film Series). From a round-table discussion with political
leaders, jurists and journalists.

is essential if citizens are to hold lawmakers accountable and voters
are to make intelligent and informed decisions.6
During the framing of M ontana’s 1972 C onstitution, the
argum ent over the right to know was thorough and robust. Fears
about governm ent becoming
in fo rm a tio n

em boldened

too large and its
M ontanans

to

ability

d ra ft

and

to control
p ass

a

constitutional provision that granted its citizens a fundamental right
to be informed.
Transcripts of the convention show that the debate returned
repeatedly to two main concerns: How best to protect citizens from
the power and abuses of government; and how to provide openness
in society and still protect individual privacy. The solution was to
give both rights constitutional protection; the docum ent ratified in
1972 contains both a right to know and a right to privacy.7
The difficulty delegates had in developing the language of both
of these provisions proved

a harbinger of the many

significant

battles to come over these two conflicting rights.
This paper will ultimately discuss the difficult and important
issue of balancing openness with individual privacy as it examines
the

significant right-to-know

cases

to come before

the M ontana

Supreme Court since 1972.
First, however, this thesis will explore the roots of the right to
know, beginning with political theorists Locke, Mill and Meiklejohn,
6See e.g. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 84, S.Ct. 710
(1964); Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
7Montana Constitutional Convention. 1971-72. Volume II, Bill
of Rights Committee Proposal. Summary of discussion over Sec. 9,
Right to Know, and Sec. 10, Right to Privacy. 631-633.
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and continuing through the eloquent debates ju st over two decades
ago by citizen framers of the Montana Constitution.

The Right to Know: Roots in Political Theory

One of the characteristics of representative government is the
respect it pays to individuals. American democracy in particular is
guided by a set of individual liberties, of which freedom of speech
and religion are listed first. None pays more respect to the value of
an individual than the right to speak and think as you wish.
The men whose theories about self-governm ent guided

the

framers of the U.S. Constitution were themselves guided by different
motives and dreams. Nonetheless, most placed a higher value on the
individual

than

governm ent.
m echanism

As
by

on

society

such,
which

or, for

government
individual

that m atter,
was

a m eans

w ell-being

could

on

a workable

to
be

an

end;

a

enhanced,

whether it helped each person develop a stronger sense of morality,
as Locke would have it, or increase happiness, as Mill wished.
Each vigorously sought to preserve the liberties of conscience.
The right to think what you want and say w hat you think was
precious to these men, each for his own reasons.

John

Locke

In John Locke’s ideal commonwealth, individuals vested their
power in the legislative branch, which sat strictly at the pleasure of
the people and, he said, “neither must nor can” transfer its power to

6

7
any other branch of government or any person.8 He also promoted a
separation of powers, similar to that found in American government
today,

w hich

vests

law m aking

au th o rity

in

one

branch

of

government, adm inistrative duties in another, and enforcem ent in
still a third.
In

L ocke’s

view ,

governm ent

ex isted

solely

fo r

the

convenience of society, to perform limited duties more efficiently
and effectively than individuals could themselves. Government's first
duty,

Locke believed, was to protect fundamental rights to life,

liberty and property. These rights, he said, originate from a "state of
nature," which he described as a circumstance in which people live
together "according to reason, without a common superior on earth
with authority to judge between them."9
Natural law, he said, reveals a set of God-given moral rules that
he believed were self-evident to all rational persons. W ithin the
bounds of natural law, man answered to no authority beyond himself
and God "without asking leave or depending upon the will of any
other m an."10
Within this natural state, Locke said, man must rely on himself
to protect his liberties and to punish those who would deny his rights
or take his property.
But it was disadvantageous if not impossible, Locke believed,
for individuals

to protect them selves, since enem ies

were often

8Locke, John, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essay Great
Books of the Western World, University of Chicago, 1952. p. 58.
9Ib id .
10Ibid.

em boldened
handedly.

by

Thus

their

evil

and

too

powerful

to

it was wise and practical, he

d efeat

said, to

singleform

a

commonwealth that relied on the collective power of its citizens to
settle

disputes,

protect

society

from

crim inals

and

degenerates,

preserve claims to property and guarantee liberties of thought and
conscience.

The

state’s power,

then, was established

through

a

contract with its members. The members in turn agreed to subm it to
majority rule in exchange for protection and security.11
L ocke’s

highest

priorities

were

rights

of

conscience

and

property. A simplistic account of his theory on property says man in
his natural state first owned himself. By extension, any products
from his labor "we may say are properly his."12 The "great and chief
end" was to protect private property, which Locke believed no man
or government had the right to take without a person's consent.13
The roots of America’s protections for speech and religion can,
in part, be traced to Locke's views on religious toleration. By natural
law, he said, a man has a right to his own opinions, to express them
and to choose his own form of religion.14 On ethical grounds, Locke
believed no governm ent nor church had any power to persecute
people

for

their

beliefs

(though

he

acknowledged

the

rig h t of

churches to expel people with contrary views). Similarly, he believed

1iO'Connor, D.J. John Locke. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
1967) 205.
12Locke, Concerning Civil Government. Great Books,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (University of Chicago, 1952). p. 30.
13Ibid, p. 53, 57.
14Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration. Great Books,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (University of Chicago, 1952).
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no individual or church should impose its opinions on another,15
reacting, no doubt, to the turbulent politics of 17th century England
and the religious persecution of Charles II.
But Locke's own tolerance had its exceptions. He argued, for
exam ple, that the

state

had

the right to outlaw

practices as sacrificing humans. He also didn't

such religious

tolerate either atheists

or Catholics, two groups he said didn't deserve protection — atheists
because

they

rejected

God

and

were

therefore

w ithout

m oral

guidance; Catholics because of their own intolerance of other religious
interpretations. Locke feared that if Catholics, for exam ple, ever
gained a majority, they would exert "undue influence" over society
and

likely

deny

the

very

liberties

of conscience he

so highly

v a lu e d .16
Such practical exceptions are notable for at least a couple of
reasons. One, they obviously conflict with Locke's general regard for
individual rights. D. J. O'Connor, an Oxford professor who interpreted
Lockean

thought in this century, suggests that the philosopher's

essay, Religious T oleration, was meant only to provide a framework
for society, that Locke knew the value of tolerance as a social policy,
yet recognized society's need for expediency.17
Finally, Locke was equally fearful of government tyranny, and
prescribed

lim iting

the

pow er

vested

in

any

com m onw ealth.

Government, he argued, must hold no power beyond what the people
approve, a notion rooted in his concept of natural law: No one has
15Ib id .
160'Connor, John Locke, pp. 211-215.
17Ib id .
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power over another, and no one can transfer to another more power
than he has himself.18
Locke also recognized that not all people in society would
subm it to the contract agreeably, that some would inevitably lose
faith in government and rebel against its power.

To maximize trust,

Locke wanted the relationship between government and its people to
work

like

a trusteeship:

pow er may

be relinquished

but never

enhanced for government's gain.19 Locke's writings are vague about
the precise lim its of government's power, but O’Connor interprets
Locke to say that as long as government obeys its citizens, it will
command their allegiance.20 The trusteeship also allowed the people
to remove government officials who abused their positions.
"There is no reason for government than to preserve their
lives, liberties and fortunes," Locke wrote. "To go further — to vest
more power than that in the state — would make man worse off than
if in the state of nature. Giving government more power disarms
(man) — and arms government — making himself the prey."21
Underlying Locke's design for the commonwealth was belief
that government would be guided by the moral code man devised
from natural

law, using his good reason

governm ent showed

the

and intuition.

utm ost respect for the

Such a

individuals

who

established it.

18Locke, John, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essay Great
Books.
19Ib id .
20O'Connor, John Locke, p. 209-210.
21Locke, John, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essav.

John

Stuart

Mill

John Stuart M ill's concern for the individual was less about
preserving

God-given liberties than it was about increasing human

happiness and self-development.

To Mill, liberties were utilitarian,

tools people could use primarily for self-improvement. His thoughts
about good

and evil were

more secular; m orality to M ill was

independentof a God or any concept of natural law.22
M ill believed that all questions about individuals "are reduced
to questions about their happiness." His goal was not to promote a set
of ethical rules for people or society; they held no ultimate value for
him. Mill believed people behaved rightly if their actions promoted
happiness, wrongly if they promoted the reverse.23
His "principle of individuality" emphasized "the importance of
self-dev elo p m en t,

self-im provem ent,

self-form ation,

se lf-resp e ct,

conscience and honor," and that all men should be respected as ends
in them selves, and not for their moral values or relationship to
G o d .24 In that sense, individuality was to Mill equivalent to self
development. Similarly, liberty to Mill was personal and essential to
se lf-d ev e lo p m e n t.
Mill's structure of self-government may be similar to Locke’s
many ways,

in

yet he valued it differently. Government was useful to

Mill primarily as a means to maximize happiness. If it could provide
22Anshutz, R.P., The Philosophy of J.S. Mill. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1953) p. 17.
23John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. (Essential Works of John Stuart
Mill. ed. Max Lemer, 1961.) Bantam Books, New York, N.Y.
24Anschutz, The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, p. 20.
I

security

12
and protect liberties better than an individual could by

himself, then it was useful, Mill believed. Mill also saw democracy as
a remedy for ignorance and a tool for self-improvement. Mill wanted
people to participate in government; participation meant education.
Democracy, he wrote, allows for the “utmost possible publicity and
liberty o f discussion, whereby ... the whole public are ... sharers in
the instruction and mental exercise derivable from it.”25
Thus he was able to argue for the widest possible extension of
representative government.
But M ill held elitist views about the intellectual pursuit of
happiness, which colored how he imagined democracy should work.
He believed that the best educated, those with the m ost varied
experience, were in the best position to make right decisions about
self-government. This idea provided the foundation for his proposal
for "plural voting" — giving those who are wiser a greater voice in
democracy, which he believed would maximize everyone's happiness.
He

w orried,

conversely,

th at

true

rep resen tativ e

governm ent

tolerated a low-grade of intelligence, which he believed to be a
problem with early American dem ocracy.26 As he aged, the worry
grew, and toward the end of his life, Mill admitted he dreaded most
"the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality o f the
mass... .”27

25John Stuart Mill, Representative Government. Second Essav.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago, 1952. p. 344.
26Anschutz, The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, p. 45.
27Ibid. p. 30.
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To Mill,

the biggest question regarding government was how

to avoid being ruled by corrupt men. Corrupt leaders not only put
their interests above that of society, but denied the less educated —
usually the poor — from the means of self-development. "The poor ...
cannot any longer be governed and treated like children," he said.28
Mill wanted legislative bodies (ill suited, he thought, to actually
govern) to be watchdogs over government : “To throw the light of
publicity on its acts: to compel a full exposition and justification of all
of them which one considers questionable.”29 If, as Locke suggested,
one of the functions of government is to provide security, then what
better role could the legislature fill than to monitor its leaders and to
rem ove them from office if they failed to perform honestly and
fairly, Mill concluded.
Mill agreed with Locke, if for somewhat different reasons, that
governm ent should have no power beyond that which the people
gave it. Mill recognized "no authority whatever in society over the
individual, except to enforce equal freedom of development... ."30
It was for the utility of it, then, that Mill argued for liberties.
Freedom of speech and conscience and participation were essential
for intellectual development, from which happiness resulted. If, as
Mill reasoned, bad decisions
then

in democracy resulted from ignorance,

the converse is also true — that inform ation and education

produce better, if not good, decisions. Mill and Locke, in their own

28Ibid. p. 21.
29J.S. Mill, Representative Gov't. Second Essav. Britannica, p.
361.
30J.S. Mill, A utobiography. (Essential Works).
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ways and for different reasons, laid groundwork for the free flow of
information as an essential element in the liberties of speech and
conscience.
"It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men’s
o p in io n s,"31 Locke wrote in thel680s. More than 200 years later, Mill
said,

“Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and

argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the
mind, must be brought before it.”32

JoBim

R aw ls

In his writings, John Rawls, the modern-day political theorist at
Harvard, bases his “first principle of justice” on an assumption that “a
dem ocratic regim e presupposes freedom of speech and

assem bly,

and liberty of thought and conscience.”33
Rawls adheres to M ill’s belief that without these liberties,
political affairs cannot be conducted rationally. If the idea is to have
free and open public discussion, then all people must have access to
the process, Rawls argues. But Rawls departs from Mill in that he
(Rawls) shows more respect for individuals based on their intrinsic
value as persons.
that

Where Mill embraces plural voting, given his belief

better-educated

decisions

and

and

therefore

m ore
are

in

in tellig en t
a

better

people
position

m ake
to

better

m axim ize

happiness for all, Rawls simply recognizes the expediency of it. Rawls
31Locke, Concerning Toleration. Great Books, p. 3.
32John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. (Essential Works).
33John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 225.
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would prefer that democracy be established in a way that all persons
have equal footing and an even chance in life; the very act of
participating, or structuring society so everyone has the same chance
to participate,

shows

proper respect for

each

individual,

Rawls

p ro p o ses.34
For

Rawls,

free speech

is

one im portant

step

to

equal

participation; the only way citizens can fully develop ideas and
thoughts, and expect those ideas to have equal weight in a discussion,
is to assure everyone has equal access to information.35
Put another way,

if

we respect the

value

o f individuals

participating in a democracy, then denying inform ation
w hile others

have it, is a contradiction.

Such

to some,

selective

sharing

disregards the principle that all people have intrinsic worth, have the
ability to think on their own,

and can vote rationally.

These “liberties of conscience” lose much of their value, Rawls
further argues, when some in society have greater means than others
to “control the course of public debate.” Inevitably, those with
“greater means” will exercise greater influence over such things as
legislation and public policy.36
Like Mill and Locke, Rawls never explicitly equates a right of
access to information on par with free speech as a political liberty,
but his belief in the invoilability of the individual may draw him
closer than either of the others to such an argument.
access

to

inform ation

34Ibid. p. 233-234.
35Ibid. 225. .
36Ibid.

is

guaranteed can

the

Only when

uneducated

or

16
uninformed participate in democracy with an expectation that their
ideas and opinions can fully develop and have weight. If we respect
the individual, then we owe each one the opportunity to be informed
and share influence.
Equal political rights of participation can heighten the “self
esteem and the sense of political competence of the average citizen,”
Rawls says,

as people engage in discussion, disagree, defend ideas

and opinions, weigh other interests and acquire a sense of duty and
obligation to participate.

In this sense, “equal political liberty is not

solely a means ... These freedoms strengthen m en’s sense of their
own self worth, enlarge their intellectual and moral sensibilities and
lay the basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon which the
stability of ju st institutions depends.”37

Alexander

A lexander
philosopher.

He

M eiklejohn
is

known

was

M eiklejohn

a 20th-century

among

free-speech

educator
scholars

turned
for

his

^analysis of the political theory embodied in the free-speech clause of
the

F irst A m endm ent.38

While he wouldn't fully embrace Rawls'

theories about individuals, his writings suggest his respect for the
dignity of individuals, which he claims is embodied in the language

37Ibid. p. 234
38Michael Hayes, 73 Virginia Law Review. Sept. '87.
Meiklejohn's discourse on Free Speech "is generally regarded as the
seminal work on the link between the First Amendment and selfgovernm ent."
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of the U.S. Constitution. The right to know as a corollary to free
speech is a prominent theme in his work.
M eiklejohn, in the wake of Justice Oliver W endell H olm es’
famous “clear and present
I Supreme Court

danger” test outlined in

a post-W orld War

case,39 sketched out a political theory based on a

fundamental respect for the dignity of individuals. In M eiklejohn’s
view

of dem ocracy under the U.S. Constitution, Am ericans

“are

pledged together to create a society in which men shall have the
status of governors of themselves.”40 Creation of self-government is
hard work

and “[i]ts victories are won, not by the carnage of battle,

but by the sweat and agony of the mind,”41 he wrote. In criticizing
H olm es’ belief that speech may be restrained when it presents a
clear and present danger to society, Meiklejohn was adamant: “ [N]o
idea, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information”
may be kept from

the people in a democratic society.42

From Locke onward

-- though each theorist

promoted his own

brand of liberalism — these thinkers all argued for the basic right to
free speech and liberties of conscience. Locke's view held that the
right to hold and express opinions fell in with natural rights, God
given, to be used for the right moral purposes, to preserve religious
beliefs and, on another level, to protect property. It was also a

39See Schenk v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919) Holmes
argued that when speech presented a "clear and present" danger, it
was not necessarily protected by the First Amendment.
40Meiklejohn, Free Speech, p. 70.
41 Ibid. p. 10.
42Ibid. p. 75.
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qualified right which could be withheld from some for the purposes
of preserving liberty and upholding the principles of natural law.
For Mill, who held a more libertarian view, rights and liberties,
free speech included, were a utility, to be used and protected as a
means to self-development. He reasoned that free speech had value
for increasing happiness for the individual, and served its role in
government by allowing individuals to check its abuses, or remove
corrupt leaders.

Mill (the elitist) also argued that free speech was

perhaps more important for some than others, since in a practical
sense,

the

better-educated

were

in a

better position

to

make

important decisions in society. Finally, Mill argues that free speech
was simply a valuable tool for self-development.
Rawls

would value free speech because

it was essential to

participation in the political process — not too different from the
utilitarian

view

disrespect for

— and

because denying

a liberty

showed

the intrinsic worth of individuals.

Meiklejohn, whose influence is
theory,

such

more limited to modern political

took rather more seriously the freedom of speech for

its

vital role in making democracy work. As a socialist, he fought for the
freedom

to

prom ote

unpopular

beliefs

and

believed

the

F irst

Amendment provided such protection at a minimum.
Obviously these men, among others, influenced not ju st the
structure of American government, but its

application. Individual

perspectives aside, each placed a high value on both the functional
and

philosophical

freedom of

values

embodied in

freedom

conscience. In the final analysis,

of

speech

and

it is im portant to
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recognize that that the First Amendment, as it came to be written
and

interpreted,

values.

One,

interpretations,

distinguishes

the
the

freedom
free

between

at least two

liberties,

of religion

language

in

speech

clause,

is

and,

designed

to

or

some
protect

individual autonomy, including the liberties of conscience outlined
most clearly by Locke and Mill. Because perhaps they lived in times
when rulers were more inclined to proscribe religion and impose on
matters of conscience, these philosophers concerned themselves to a
greater extent with the freedom to be left alone, the freedom to
think and conduct themselves as they wished. Religious freedom
served that end, and to an extent, so did freedom of speech — the
right to think what you want was insignificant without the right to
freely express it, exchange views with others, debate and search for
truth. In one sense, then, freedom of religion and speech were critical
to the development of an individual, and critical to a definition of
autonom y.
In another sense, however, the First Amendment and its freespeech

language

was

m ore

concerned

w ith

the

fun ctio n

of

democracy. This value was developed perhaps more thoroughly by
M ill, who took a somewhat mechanical view of dem ocracy. To
interpret him in the context of the First Am endm ent m ight go
something like this: Democracy is the best form of government to
promote overall happiness. Freedom of expression is essential to
make democracy work, therefore in democracy, a constitution must
protect speech

for its value in promoting happiness.
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Rawls and Meiklejohn, of course, concerned themselves too
with free speech — and free press — as instruments of democracy.
Rawls

likes free

speech for its guarantee of equal participation

(which of course is also an autonomy issue), while M eiklejohn is
more direct in his assertion that democracy cannot fully function
without free speech and free press.
It must also be said, of course, that the instrumental value and
the

autonom y

Amendment
linked

value

of

the

freedom s

protected

in

the

F irst

create an inherent conflict. The value of autonomy is

inextricably

to the value we place

on privacy,

and

our

expectations that we will be let alone to think and believe and
discuss matters as we wish. The instrumental value of the First
Amendment

freedoms of speech and press are linked directly with

our notions

of -- and our desire for — publicity. If democracy is to

function properly, its citizens must be able to depend on the free
flow of information.
These separate values, explored and developed

by political

theorists for centuries, remain in conflict today, and are present in
most First Amendment arguments, both legal and philosophical.
U.S.

Supreme

Court has

struggled

in stru m e n ta l

and

Amendment,

although many of the

cases
speech

autonom y

through

values

the

im bedded

years
in

over
the

The
the
F irst

im portant access-to-inform ation

concentrated more on the instrum ental values

of the free

and press clauses. And, as we shall see, the framers of

M ontana's

new constitution

also

sought to dim inish

the

tension
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between these two important values, which they called the right to
privacy and the right to know.
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The Supreme Court and the Right to Know

In

the

classic

F irst

Am endm ent

co n fro n tatio n

over

the

publication of the government's secret history of the Vietnam War,
known as the Pentagon Papers, in 1971,43 Justice Hugo Black issued a
stern message to the president and Congress, chastising them for
keeping secrets from the people in the name of national security.
“The guarding

of m ilitary

and diplom atic

secrets

at the

expense of inform ed representational government provides no real
security

for

foundation

our
of

R epublic,” he

real

security

in

wrote.

R ather,

American

Black

society

is

said,
the

the
F irst

Amendment, which guarantees the very rights that the government
sought to restrict — freedom of speech and of the press.

"The

Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure the Government," Black
said .44
But Justice Black, an absolutist on issues of free speech in a
dem ocracy, was unusual. Over the years, the Supreme Court has
never ruled that the Constitution offers unqualified protection for a
right to know.
However, in cases scattered over history, the high court has
given the right to know some support, in direct and indirect ways.
Publishers, for exam ple, are protected from prior restraint by a

43New York Times v. U.S.. 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971)
44Ibid.
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landmark ruling, Near v. M innesota.45 in 1931 that said restraining
publication was "the essence of censorship." N ear didn't address the
issue of citizen's right to know, of course, but it was an important
early ruling: Had N ear upheld prior restraint, the whole argument for
access

to

diminished.

governm ent

inform ation

would

have

been

severely

Forty years later, the Pentagon Papers case reaffirmed

and elaborated on the vital role of the press to "bare the secrets of
government and inform the people." A right of access to criminal
courts was established in 1980 in Richmond

N ew spapers.

In c.:46 a

subsequent case extended the right of access to jury selection;47 and
still another struck down a state law that required the courtroom to
be closed during testimony from minors in sexual abuse trials.48
Beyond criminal trials and related proceedings, the Supreme
Court has said that the right to government-held inform ation is at
best a qualified right; but in both dissents and m ajority opinions
justices have repeatedly linked the right to know with what one
justice called the "core purpose" of the F irst Amendment — that
citizens have a right to participate in democracy.49

45Near v. Minnesota el rel. Olson. 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625
(1 931 ).
46Richmond Newspapers. Inc.. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
47Press-Enterprise Co. V. Superior Court. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
48Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
49 Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 575. Chief Justice Burger
wrote that the freedoms of speech and press, and the rights to
assemble and petition the government "share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to
the functioning of government."
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In a 1974 dissent, for example, Justice Lewis Powell disagreed
w ith

the

ruling

that

denied

new spaper

reporters

the

rig h t

to

interview convicts in a prison. Powell argued that the political ends
of a democracy demanded a different decision: “(P)ublic debate must
not only be unfettered; it must also be informed.”50
Sim ilarly,

in

1980 Justice

concurrence with Richm ond

W illiam

Brennan

w rote

in

his

N ew spapers, the case where a Virginia

new spaper sued for the right to attend

a m urder trial, that an

informed citizenry is “necessary for a democracy to survive.”51
Such declarations, of course, fall short of making the right to
know a constitutionally protected liberty equal to free speech. In a
1987 analysis of the right to know in the V irginia Law Review,
author Michael Hayes says that until R ic h m o n d

granted courtroom

access inl980, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly rejected claims of
a

c o n s titu tio n a l

rig h t

of

access

to

g o v e rn m e n t-c o n tro lle d

inform atio n .”52
But since

1931, when N ear

v.

M innesota

p rohibited

the

governm ent from restraining publication of defam atory inform ation
on

F irst

recognized

A m endm ent
the

grounds,

relationship

the

between

court

also

free

speech

has
and

repeatedly
effective

democracy. It was inl936, in a case about taxation and the press,53
w hen,

according

to

H ayes,

the

court

first

reco gnized

50Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.. 417 U.S. 862-63 (1974).
51Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 588.
52Hayes, "Whatever Happened to the ’Right to Know’?" 73
Virginia Law Review. Sept. 1987.
53Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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“fundam ental

link

betw een

the

F irst

A m endm ent

and

self-

g o v ern m en t.”
But then i n i 965, when a plaintiff claimed that a ban on travel
to Cuba restricted his First Amendment right to gather information
about government policies, the court said, "The right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained
i n f o r m a t i o n . " 54
interview

right to

gather

In 1974, the court lim ited reporters' rights to

prisoners55 and then, in 1978, reaffirmed that position.56

In 1979, the court refused in Gannett v. D ePasquale to grant
public

access to

co n tro v ersial

and

a pretrial suppression hearing. The ruling
confusing

because

m any,

in clu d in g

was

Justice

Blackmun who dissented, interpreted it to mean that the right of
access to the e n t i r e

trial could be denied, based

not on First

Amendment grounds but on an interpretation of the right to a public
trial guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment.57
Meanwhile, the case for access was slowly growing, pushed in
part by

the dissents

of Justice Powell58 and Justice John

Paul

S te v e n s ,59 both of whom argued that traditional political theory
supports the right to know.

54Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
55Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
56Houchins v. KOED. Inc.. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
57See Richmond Newspapers concurrence by Justice Blackmun,
who took one more opportunity to criticize G an n ett and acknowledge
the confusion it caused journalists.
58S ax h e. 417, U.S. 843, 862-63. It is here tht Powell said "Public
debate must not only be unfettered, it must be informed."
59Houchins v. KOED. Inc.. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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Then in 1980,

R ic h m o n d

N e w sp a p e rs

p rovided

a

breakthrough. The court's ruling that the public had a constitutional
right to attend criminal trials meant, in Hayes’ view, that “a right of
access was born.”60
C hief

Justice

W arren

Burger

wrote

the

lead

opinion

in

R ic h m o n d : in all, seven justices agreed that a right of access was
im p licit

in

the

F irst

Am endm ent.61 In his

concurrence, Justice

Stevens called it "a watershed case" because "never before has (the
court) squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy m atter is
entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever... ,62
Burger's opinion relied in part on a political theory argument,
saying that access to trials is part of the “core purpose” of the First
A m en d m en t.63 Burger also relied on a classic conservative argument,
that a long tradition of openness in criminal trials also supported the
right. But Burger's decision was narrowly drawn, saying that in
access cases outside criminal trials where a tradition of openness
doesn’t exist, access could be denied.64
In his concurrence (joined by Justice Marshall), Justice Brennan
also relied on political theory, yet warned that a right of access was
“ th e o re tica lly
courts

rule

e n d le ss,” 65 and proposed guidelines to help lower
in

subsequent

cases.

First,

a right

of

access

was

60Hayes, 73 Virginia LR. p. 1115.
61Eight justices took part in this case and wrote a total of seven
opinions, including one dissent. Justice Powell did not vote.
62Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. 555.
63Ibid.
64Ibid.
65Ib id .
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strengthened by a tradition of openness.

Second, access must play a

“significant positive role” in the process or function of government.
When these two tests were met, he said, then government must have
a “compelling” interest to support closure.66
This was significant. As Justice Stevens added in his concurring
opinion: "For the first time, the Court unequivocally holds than an
arbitrary

interference with access to im portant inform ation is an

abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by
the First Amendment."67
R ic h m o n d had the added benefit of elim inating some of the
confusion in G a n n e tt: now it was clear at least that the trial itself was
open.
Two years later, Brennan applied his own guidelines from
R ich m o n d in

a case that struck down a Massachussets' law requiring

judges to exclude the public from the testimony of minors in sexual
abuse cases.68 In writing the

majority opinion, Brennan relied on the

reasoning in R ich m o n d that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
ensure that citizens can "effectively participate in and contribute to
our republican system of self-government."69

O nce

a g a in ,

however, the decision applied only to criminal trials. In 1984, the
Supreme Court found a right of access to voir dire, or jury selection, a
proceeding obviously connected to, but technically outside, the trial
its e lf .70

Brennan's

"tradition

of openness"

and

"contribution

66Ib id .
67Ib id .
68Globe Newspapers Co. 457 U.S. 596.
69Ib id .
70Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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function" tests played a role in this decision and in some subsequent
lower court cases, but have
M eanw hile,

in

some

never become legal doctrine.
lower

courts

a

d ifferen t

trend

was

emerging, according to Hayes. More and more, judges in federal and
state courts began using a balancing test to determine the strength of
a First Amendment right of access. As applied, the test would weigh
"the

public's

interest

in

obtaining

...

inform ation

against

the

government's interest in refusing to provide it."71
The balancing test implicitly says, of course, that the right to
know is limited; courts could, and did, find that privacy, property or
fair trial rights could overrule or limit access to information. In one
case out of Pennsylvania, Capital Cities Inc. v. Chester.72 the Third
Circuit Court used Brennan's test to deny access to state records, and
in so doing recommended that some sort of balancing test was
preferable to Brennan’s approach in determining the public's right to
know. And that job, the court said, was best left to state lawmakers,
not judges.
In

1986, the W ilkes-Barre Times L eader sought docum ents

from the state Department of Environmental Resources, hoping to
prove

its

suspicion

that

the

state

had

enforcem ent of laws covering contamination

discrim in ated

in

its

of groundwater. The

state refused to release the documents and the Times Leader sued
and lost. In an appeal to the Third Circuit, the newspaper contended
that the denial of access to a public agency’s records “abridged the

71Hayes, Virginia Law Review, p. 1126.
72797 F2d 1164. (3rd Cir. 1986)
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public’s historic [F]irst [A]mendment right to information to evaluate
the governm ent’s effectiveness.”73
The Third Circuit rejected the newspaper’s argument based on
one part of Brennan’s test, and said the newspaper failed to prove
that a historical tradition of access to the agency’s documents existed.
M oreover, the court said, that since the Supreme Court has never
recognized an absolute right of access in the First Amendment, it
placed the judiciary in the position of deciding between competing
political interests. That job, the court said, should be done in the
le g isla tu re .74
The notion of politicians determining rights of access is not
new,

of

course.

Legislatures

in

every

state

have

passed

laws

regulating open meetings, records and more. But the approach has
inherent problems, including unending conflicts betw een the selfprotective instincts of politicians and bureaucrats, and the public’s
need for maximum information. And it raises at least one important
question: How can citizens participate fully in making laws regulating
openness if they don’t already have full access to inform ation, and

73Barbara Greenberg, 33 Journal of Urban and Contemporary
L aw . Washington University, Summer 1988. A review and
co m m en tary .
74Ibid. NOTE: Greenberg assailed the court's decision: "The
Third Circuit refused to read the Supreme Court's decisions as
mandating an expansion of the First Amendment protection ... the
Third Circuit denigrated the Supreme Court's recognition of the right
of access." Greenberg also pointed out that Brennan's tradition of
openness test would require the newspaper to show that the
agency’s documents had ben "generally available during the colonial
period ... Proving a tradition of access is virtually impossible because
few governmental agencies existed at that time."
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are unaware of issues or corruption already held secret? And, as
Judge Gibbons pointed out in his dissent on Capital C ities, there is
something fundamentally disturbing about "a model of government
in which elected officials are deemed to have the delegated power to
decide for us what we need to know."75
The political process has not, however, been unresponsive. The
Freedom of Information Act was passed by Congress in 1966 and
requires

government agencies to produce inform ation

on request,

unless the information is restricted under one of nine exem ptions.7 6
(It is

common

know ledge,

at least among jo u rn alists,

that

the

procedures for requesting information under FOIA are onerous and
expensive,

and

often

obstructive,

given

the

broadness

of

the

exem p tio n s.)
State access laws, in most cases, also contain broad exemptions,
according to a survey by Hayes. Montana's Open Meetings law is a
case in point: U ntil recently struck down, provisions in the law
allowed meetings to be closed for discussion of collective bargaining
or litigation. The law also has a privacy exemption.77 And, for better
or for worse, Montana code contains scores of other statutes that
restrict access to courts, records, and m eetings, each

attem pting

75Ib id .
76Freedom of Information Act. U.S. Code, vol. 28, sec. 552 (a)
(3). The exemptions allow the government to withhold information in
the following general categories: national defense, foreign policy,
information protected by statute, trade secrets or commercial
information that is privileged or confidential, medical files,
investigative records of law agencies and even some geological and
geophysical information.
77Montana Codes Annotated 2-3-201 through 203. (1987)
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presumably to strike a balance between the public's right to know
and a perceived need for privacy or secrecy.78 How some of these
laws have stood up against Montana’s constitutional right to know

is,

of course, what this paper ultimately will explore.
In summary, a brief look at judicial history makes clear that
the

courts

have

never fully

embraced

Justice

Black's

absolutist

appeal, nor the somewhat more qualified approach to free speech
liberties taken by

Alexander Meiklejohn.

Even though N ea r. R ich m o n d . G lobe and New York Times, for
example, all considered free speech for its value to the functioning of
dem ocracy

(not necessarily

as it conflicted

with

autonomy

and

related liberties

of conscience) a federal right to know is today

at

best a lim ited

right without the same protection

of

as freedom

speech; it has its firmest footing in the criminal courtrooms, and is
shakier outside the courts.
M ontana

ju d g es,

The lower courts, and as we shall see,

increasingly

are

applying

balancing

tests

to

determine access rights, which may be more in line with one of John
Rawls' main principles; the individual has only as much right to
liberty as is compatible with the liberty of others.
Nonetheless, as Hayes points out, at least a balancing test
presumes a right to government-held information exists.

78MCA, Title 1, p. 7. (1987) The intent here is to draw attention
to the plethora of legislation related to the right to know. A more
complete inspection of the statutes is beyond the scope of this paper.

Roots

in

Montana:

The

1972

Constitutional

Convention

On Feb. 22, 1972, the Bill of Rights committee presented its
work to the Montana Constitutional Convention. Wade Dahood, who
was

chairman of

thecommittee

and a Butte attorney,introduced the

docum ents with language that captured the essence

of dem ocratic

th eo ry :
“The guidelines and protections for the exercise of liberty in a
free society,”

Dahood wrote, “come not from the government but

from the people who create the government.” 79
T h at

prim ary

concept of

self-governm ent

provided

the

foundation for the entire Declaration of Rights, which included Art.
II, Sec. 9, M ontana’s unique “right to know” provision.

Dahood’s

committee recommended that such concepts as the right to privacy
and the right to know should be given, for the first time in Montana,
constitutional protection. Government must never forget that it was
“created solely for the welfare of the people,” the committee wrote.80
The

com m ittee then

offered, among

35

enum erated

rights,

two

articles that defined and guaranteed the citizen’s right of access: the
right to participate and the right to know.81
79Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972. Vol. II: Bill
of Rights Committee Proposal, p. 619.
80Ib id .
8 C onstitution of the State of Montana, art. II, sec. 8 (1972). The
Right of Participation: "The public has the right to expect
governmental agencies to afford such reasonable opportunity for
citizen participation in the operation of the agencies prior to the final
decision as may be provided by law."
32
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The committee prefaced its introduction of the draft bill of
rights

w ith a comment:

M ontanans typically

distrust governm ent

authority, and the drafters said they hoped the constitutional right to
particip ate

"w ill

increasingly

play

expressed

a

role

in

regarding

reversing
bureaucratic

the

dissatisfactions

authority

insulated

from public scrutiny ... .”82
The right to know, which the committee called a "companion
provision" to the right to participate,

arises “out of the increasing

concern ... that government’s sheer bigness threatens the effective
excercise of citizenship... .”83
The com mittee then quoted from the pream ble to the state
Open Meetings Law, which had existed in Montana codes since 1963:
“The people of the state do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to
the agencies which serve them.”84
Thus the stage was set. The constitutional rights to know and to
participate were rooted
would

ignore

the

in historical skepticism t|h a t governm ent

source

of its

powers

and

abuse

the

pow ers

delegated to it. The provisions also suggest the drafters desire that
these rights would encourage Montana citizens to fully excercise the
fundam ental duty in a democracy, to be

governors

rather

than

simply be governed. Thus the right to know emphasized the value of
free speech in making government work better.

82Con Con of 1971-72. Vol. II, p. 631.
83Ib id .
84Revised Codes of Montana. 82-3401, 1947. This language
remains in the preamble to the state Open Meetings Law. See MCA 2 3 -2 0 1 .
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This language, too, reflects several of the fears, concerns and
issues

raised by the early philosophers like Mill and Locke. Dahood's

words, for example, that government was created "solely for the
welfare of the people" embraces Locke's notion that "there is no
reason for government than to preserve their lives, liberties and
f o r tu n e s ." 85 Moreover, the Open Meetings Law pream ble — "the
people ... do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty" —

is strikingly

sim ilar to an element of Locke’s natural law theory, that no one
individual has power over another, and that therefore government
should have no power beyond what the people approve.
The bill of rights committee worried about a loss of trust
betw een citizens and government and hoped
rights

to know

and participate

that excercising

would rebuild

that trust.

the

Locke

believed government would command the allegiance of its citizens if
it used its power only for the public's benefit. John Stuart Mill
worried about this issue on two levels; one, that corrupt leaders
would put their own interests first, and, two, ordinary citizens would
be denied the opportunity to participate in government, an excercise
that he believed would increase their knowledge and skills.
And so, the framers by their discussion and their intent were
attempting to resolve the conflict within the First Amendment. There
is a correlation between freedoms of speech and press and the right
to know as they contribute to the functioning of democracy, they
said. When it comes to making government work and encouraging
the fullest participation and development of citizens, the framers

85Locke, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essav.
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wanted to go further than simply guaranteeing free speech and a
free press. In a sense, the right to know was an attempt to further
clarify what is meant by free speech and a free press.

If

th e

delegates were fierce in their desire for open government, they were
equally passionate about protecting the autonomy of its citizens. The
minutes of the convention reveal the extent of the debate over the
wording of the privacy and right-to-know provisions. Since judges
and

lawm akers alike in the years

to come

would

search

these

passages not ju st for the plain meanings, but also for their intent,
each word was carefully chosen and fully discussed.
The obvious conflict between privacy and the right to know
would leave for the courts and legislatures the difficult job of finding
a fair and equitable balance. But which branch of government should
take the lead role in determining that balance? Should the language
of the constitution suggest whether income tax returns are public or
private? Should it say whether school board meetings are open or
closed, and why? Obviously, no article in the constitution could
address individual cases, so the debate centered on the question of
how, within the spare language of a constitutional provision, to
provide broad guidance to the courts and the legislature.
Records of the debate over the right to know

show little

appetite for an unqualified right to know; the privacy exemption was
a key element from the beginning. However, delegate Dorothy Eck,
w orrying

that

governm ent

agencies

may

use

the

exem ption

unw isely, argued for language that favored openness. Thus,

she

prom pted the drafting committee to amend the original language

w ith ju s t

one

word:
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clearly .86 As finally proposed to the full

convention then, Art. II, Sec. 9 said:
No person shall be deprived of the right
to examine docum ents or to observe the
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies
of state governm ent and its subdivisions,
except in cases in which the demands of
individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits
of public disclosure (emphasis added).
Again the debate turned to the issue of who should arbitrate
the balance.

Some delegates

wanted the legislature

to

have

the

power and argued for the words "except as may be provided by law"
to be inserted. When privacy rights clashed with the right to know,
some

delegates

w orried

that

cum bersom e to react with

the

speed

courts

were too

and efficiency. The

slow

and

opposition

argued legislators should not be encouraged to fashion their own
exem ptions to the right to know, believing lawm akers were too
inclined to vote for the secrecy that bureaucrats and politicians so
often desired.87
Ultimately, the phrase was rejected, and the provision reflected
w hat the framers intended:

the

ultimate authority for

interpreting

the balance between privacy

and the right to know should lie with

the courts.
But the debate w asn’t over. The M ontana press vigorously
resisted the privacy exemption, and lobbied the delegates to throw it
out. The Missoulian editorialized that the right-to-know provision as
86Con Con of 1971-72. Vol. V, Verbatim Transcript, 1670-71.
87Ibid. 1971-1679.
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written was a “right to conceal,” reasoning that government agencies
could use the privacy exemption to hide whatever inform ation they
wished. The M ontana Press Association and some of its members
agreed, arguing that the exemption was so vaguely worded as to
allow government agencies routinely to operate in secret and claim
privacy exemptions for their own convenience.88 But the pleas were
ultimately rejected, and the privacy exemption remained.
In the end, the convention proposed a unique article to the new
state Constitution. Citizens had, as a fundamental liberty, the right of
access to the workings of their government. The framers' intent was
clear and the delegates felt the final wording accomplished several
important things: Article II, Section 9 guaranteed the right to know,
except when the demands of individual privacy89 outweighed it;
those demands of privacy must “clearly” exceed the public’s right to
know, tipping the balance in favor of openness. And finally, the
debate — and the ultimate drafting of the right to know provision
itself — would clarify

that for governm ent to function

best in

Montana, it's citizens must have the right to know what it was doing.

88Ibid. 1672-73.
89COMMENT: At one point in the Con Con debate, a delegate
inquired whether "individual*1 could also mean a corporation. The
question implicitly anticipated the time when a corporation or
perhaps even a government agency might claim the right to
"individual privacy." Wade Dahood, chairman of the Bill of Rights
Committee, responded that "an individual, in my judgment, would
not be a corporation." Later, a Montana Supreme Court ruled just the
opposite, and extended individual privacy rights to a telephone
company. See Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dept, of
Public Service Regulation. 634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981).
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L egislative

Im plem entation

The framers’ hopes that the legislature would show restraint in
its

interpretation

M ontana

Code

governm ent

of the right
A nnotated

agencies

on

is

how

to

know w ere

flush

w ith

to

manage

governm ent’s business. MCA lists scores of

soon

dim inished.

statu tes
public

that

access

d irect
to

the

statutes covering access

to judicial proceedings, student records, law enforcem ent documents,
child custody and child abuse matters, medical records, parole board
proceedings, weather modification records and more.90
The

most important, perhaps, of all

these enactm ents

is the

Montana Open Meetings Law, which is a broad statute directing all
public

boards

and

agencies

to perm it

public

access to

their

deliberations. It states in part:
The legislature finds and declares that
public boards, com m issions, councils, and
other public agencies in this state exist to aid
in the conduct of the peoples’ business. It is
the intent of this
part that actions and
d e lib eratio n s of all agencies sh all be
conducted openly. The people of the state do
not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the
agencies which serve them.
Toward these
ends, the provisions of the part shall be
liberally construed.91
Subsequent provisions of the law, as

revised in 1987, spell out

more clearly what openness means, and further define what is meant
90M C A , Title 1, p. 7. (1987)
91M C A . 2-3-201 (1987)
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by “public boards, commissions, councils, and other public agencies...”
The statute also defines a "meeting" as "the convening of a quorum of
the constituent membership ... ."
It also addresses individual privacy in section (3), which reads:
... the presiding officer of any meeting
may close the meeting during the time the
discussion relates to a matter of individual
privacy and then if and only if the presiding
o fficer determ ines that the dem ands of
individual privacy clearly exceed the m erits
of public disclosure. The right of individual
privacy may be waived by the individual
about whom the discussion pertains and, in
that event, the meeting shall be open.92
An additional section stipulated

that meetings may

be closed

“to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to collective
bargaining or litigating position of the public agency.”93 In 1990 and
in

1992,

the

M ontana

Supreme

Court

struck

dow n

collective

bargaining and litigation exemptions, saying the plain language
the

constitution

was clear that individual privacy

w as the

of
only

exception to openness.94
Within the many other laws regarding open government, much
of the language directs how and under what circum stances

state

agencies or boards m ust make deliberations and records open to
public inspection. However, many also restrict or deny access in some
92Ibid. 2-3-203 (1), (2).
93Ibid. (4)
94See Associated Press et. al. v. Board of Education. 246 Mont.
386 (1991) and Great Falls Tribune Company. Inc.. v. Great Falls
Public Schools. 255 Mont. 125.
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way. For example, the state Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, which
oversees the exploration and development of oil and gas reserves, is
perm itted
secrets"

by statute
it

inherits

to

keep

in

the

confidential

course

of

any so-called

routine

"trade

bu sin ess.95

Law

enforcem ent agencies can restrict access to inform ation when the
need for

"law enforcem ent security" exceeds

k n o w .96These examples typify perhaps what
prevent:

legislation

authority.

that

allows

secrecy

the public’s right to
the framers hoped to

with

no

constitutional

On their face, neither of these laws conform

to

the

language of the right to know. Extending confidentiality to trade
secrets

grants privacy rights to corporations, a step the framers

explicitly

declined

to take. Law enforcem ent security

needs

are

addressed nowhere in the Constitution, and if tested, may well meet
the

same

fate

as

the

exem ptions

for

litigation

and

collective

barg ain in g .
In any case, as the Constitutional
p erh ap s,

the

leg islatu re

needed

no

Convention debates foretold,
en co u rag em en t

to

w rite

legislation to further define the right to know and the right to
privacy.

The only

question

left, then,

is

w hether the

statutory

enactm ents remained true to the language and the intent of the
M ontana Constitution.

95M CA 82-11-117.
96MC A 7-1-4144.

The

Montana Cases

Since the new constitution was ratified in 1972, 13 Supreme
Court cases have tested the right to know provision.97
One measure of a constitutional liberty like the right to know is
whether it can withstand legislative enactments. It is the role of the
judiciary to decide if laws conform to — and respect — fundamental
rights granted by a constitution. Open meeting and privacy statutes
are increasingly being tested before the M ontana Supreme Court.
This section examines most of those cases and the paper concludes
with an assessment how the language and intent of Article II, Section
9 has stood up to scrutiny

over the past two decades.

Open

In
m eetings,

the cases
the

Meetings

that tested

agencies

the governm ent's

routinely

asserted

they

pow er to close
had

m et

the

requirements of the open meetings law. But in two such cases the
Supreme Court found flagrant violations.98

A third case

presented,

97University of Montana Law Library indices, Pacific Reporter
2d. and Montana Reports.
98Board of Trustees v. Board of County Commissioners of
Yellowstone Countv 606 P.2d 1069 (Mont. 1980) and Jarussi v. Board
of Trustees. 664 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1983).
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at least theoretically, a tougher challenge. In Missoulian v. Board of
R e g e n ts . "

the justices were asked to rule whether the individual

privacy rights of a university president outweighed the public's right
to be present during an evaluation of his job performance. The right
to know lost decisively in this important instance.
The

latest two open-meetings cases,

decided

in

1991

and

1992,100

challenged statutory exemptions that permitted closed meetings for
discu ssio n s

about

strategy

related

to

litig atio n

or

co llectiv e

barg ain in g .
In these opinions, the court clearly said that when the legislature
makes laws that permit secrecy in government, it must provide clear
evidence that a right to individual privacy is endangered,

or the

statutes will fall.
Here is a look at the open meetings cases, the first of which was
decided in 1980:
The Yellowstone County Board of Commissioners held public
meetings in 1978 to hear testimony over a new subdivision in the
Huntley Project School District. School officials and others had an
interest in the subdivision’s approval because of its potential impact
on

school

enrollm ent.

In

a

public

m eeting

in

D ecem ber,

commissioners gave conditional approval to the project, but did not
take a formal vote.

Later that same day, two of the commissioners —

" 2 0 7 Mont. 513 (1983).
100The Associated Press v. Board of Public Education. 246 Mont.
386 (1991) and Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Public Schools.
255 Mont. 125 (1992).
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in a telephone conference call with two other county officials —
officially approved the subdivision. A third com m issioner did not
participate in the conference call, nor was he apprised of the call in
advance. The commissioners claimed that the telephone vote was not
a new meeting, rather a continuation of the discussion earlier in the
day.
The school district sued, alleging the final vote was in fact an
illegal

secret meeting primarily because the public was not given

adequate notice that the board would be taking a final vote on the
m atter.

The

Suprem e

Court

determined

first

that

a

telephone

conference call between a quorum of the board constituted a meeting
under the legal definition,101 and said the telephone vote appeared
to deliberately flout the Open Meetings Law since the time and place
of the final vote had not been publicly announced, and since one of
the

com m issioners

hadn't

been

advised

of

the

v o te .102 To be

effective, the Open Meetings Law requires sufficient notice to the

101A "meeting" is defined as " ... the convening of a quorum of
the constituent membership of a public agency, whether corporal or
by means of electronic equipment, to hear, discuss, or act upon a
matter over which the agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction,
or advisory power." 2-3-202, MCA.
102Section 2-3-103(1), MCA provides that "Each agency shall
develop procedures for permitting and encouraging the public to
participate in agency decisions that are of signficant interest to the
public. The procedures shall assure adequate notice and assist public
participation before a final agency action is taken that is of
significant interest to the public."
Further, Section 7-5-2122, MCA requires county commissioners
to establish and publicize regular meeting times. Further, it says,
”[c]ommissioners may, by resolution and prior 2 days' posted public
notice, designate another meeting time and place."
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public of where and when the meeting is to take place, the court said,
adding that without public notice, a meeting is open in theory only.
"This type of clandestine meeting violates the spirit and the letter of
the Montana Open Meetings Law," the ruling said.
The court further noted that the district court had ruled that
the meeting was in fact illegal, but that it had declined to nullify the
vote and to order a new meeting in compliance with the law. It
ordered the board

to reconvene on the m atter, and criticized the

district judge for letting "substance overtake form."

Jarussi v. Board

of Trustees

In 1978, a St. Ignatius High School principal, Louis Jarussi, sued
his school board after a dispute over his salary and his subsequent
firing.

Jarussi

contended board membersmet twice in illegal secret

sessions, the first time to consider Jarussi’s salary request for the
upcoming year and the second time to fire him when they learned he
had contacted a lawyer in response to their first closed meeting.
The district court found that the board's meetings violated the
state Open Meetings Law and voided the decision.
The school board appealed, claiming state law allows secret
m eetings
C ourt

to discuss collective

upheld

exemption didn’t

bargaining

the district court, saying
apply,

strategy.

The

the collective

Supreme
bargaining

since Jarussi wasan individual represented

by no bargaining agent or union, nor was

he acting on behalf of a

union. The court said Jarussi had a right to be present during the
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board's deliberations, and upheld damages awarded him in district
c o u rt.103

Missoulian v. Board of Regents

Throughout the 1970s, the competing issues of right to know
and right to privacy had not come up in an open meetings case.
I n i 980, the M issoulian sued the University of M ontana Board of
R e g e n t s 104 after its reporter, Mea Andrews, was shut out of a
m eeting

in which the regents conducted

an

annual perform ance

evaluation of UM President Richard Bowers. The regents closed the
meeting on the grounds that

Bowers' right to privacy was more

im portant than the public's right to attend the evaluation. D istrict
court ruled in favor of the regents, and Missoulian editors appealed.
This case focused on the privacy exem ption in
M eetings

the Open

L aw ,105 and in so doing interpreted the central conflict

within Art. II, Sec. 9: Do the privacy rights of a university president
outweigh the public’s right to be present during an evaluation of his
p e rfo rm a n c e ?
The M issoulian argued that the privacy exem ption in the
Constitution was intended to protect personal m atters of family or

103Jarussi v. Board of Trustees.
104Missoulian v. Board of Regents. 207 Mont. 513 (1983).
105M CA 2-3-203 (3). The statute says, in part: " ... The presiding
officer of any meeting may close the meeting during the time the
discussion relates to a matter of individual privacy and then if and
only if the presiding officer determines that the demands of
individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure."

health

— issues

of

autonomy

not

necessarily

related
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the

to

president's job performance. Further, the newspaper said, the status
of a university president diminishes his privacy rights because he is
a “policy making official whose actions are of greater importance to
the public.” 106 And finally, the newspaper argued,
did

contain

discussion

if the evaluation

about the president’s personal

life,

such

m atters could be saved for private discussion, leaving larger issues
open for public scrutiny.
The Supreme Court rejected the newspaper’s arguments one by
one.

To

determ ine

whether an individual has

a constitutionally

protected right to privacy, the court used a two-part test, which it
had applied in a 1982 records case, Montana Human Rights Division
v. City of Billings. 107 and which the U.S. Supreme Court had devised
in 1967 in Katz v. United States.108 The K atz test said an individual
has a protected right to privacy when the person has a “subjective or
actual expectation

of privacy"

and when

"society

is

w illing

to

recognize that expectations as reasonable.”109
The court ruled in M is s o u lia n
ap p lied :

U n iv ersity

presid en ts

that both prongs of the test
expected

p riv acy

in

th e ir

perform ance reviews, the court said, because the board of regents
had

prom ised

them

in

advance

that the

evaluations

confidential.

iQ6Missoulian v. Board of Regents, p. 526.
107649 P.2d 1283.
108389 U.S. 347 (1967).
109Ib id .

would

be

For the second prong of the test, the justices
perform ance

evaluation

process

in

detail,

and

examined

cited
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the

num erous

examples of how secret discussions of procedures and management
policies can actually benefit the public. A confidential evaluation is so
im portant to a university president, the

justices said, that he could

even fail in his job without it:
A university president
depends to a
large degree upon good relations and a strong
im age w ith in
the com m unity
fo r the
successful accom plishm ent of his jo b . A
university president has a good reason to
expect that his unabashed views, his candid
evaluations of himself and his staff, and his
p ercep tio n s o f the facu lty w ill rem ain
p riv a te .110
In part on that basis, society recognizes this expectation of
privacy

as reasonable,

the

court

said.

For

further evidence,

it

reminded the Missoulian that its own publisher, then Tom C. Brown,
had once written an editorial supporting the need for

confidential

evaluations of public officials.
No common ground could be found. The Missoulian suggested a
compromise, and asked that the regents adopt “agenda scheduling,”
whereby professional matters not related to the president’s privacy
be separated from the private meeting and be discussed publicly. No
again, said the court: "There is so much interweaving of sensitive
material that it would have been impossible

110M issoulian. p. 526.

... to separate private
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m atter from non-private to protect privacy, or to avoid destroying
the effectiveness of the evaluations."111

AP v. Board of Education

The latest two open meetings cases struck down two of three
exemptions to the state Open Meetings Law. In the first, decided in
1990, the Associated Press, 11 daily newspapers and two newspaper
organizations sued the state Board of Public Instruction112 after the
board m et in secret with its attorneys. The meeting was called to
discuss a legal challenge to an order from the governor that the
board

subm it for

his

review

and

approval

a

set

of

proposed

administrative rules. The news organizations alleged the meeting was
illegally closed to the public; the board responded that the closed
session m et the requirem ents of the Open M eetings Law, which
allowed exemptions for discussion of litigation strategy.113
The issue, the court said, is whether the legislature has the
authority to create exemptions to open meetings beyond the privacy
exemption written into the language of Art. II, Sec. 9.
The Board of Education based its arguments not in political
theory, but in public policy. On a practical level, the board said, all

l n Ibid. p. 535.
112Associated Press et. al. v. Board of Public Education. Cause
No. BDV-89-121.
113M CA 2-3-203, (4): " ... a meeting may be closed to discuss a
strategy to be followed with respect to collective bargaining or
litigation when an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on
the bargaining or litigating position of the public agency."

attorneys

m ust

have

the

freedom

for

w ide-ranging

and
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frank

discussions with their

clients, which is only

possible in private.

Furthermore, the board

argued, discussing legal

matters in an open

forum would divulge strategies
Placing itself on such

that could sabotage the board’s case.

uneven ground with an adversary would be

unsound policy and violate the client's right to due process under the
law, the board’s attorneys said.
D istrict court Judge Jeffrey Sherlock ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, and Sherlock's ruling is noteworthy because his opinion —
and much of his actual language — formed the foundation for the
Supreme Court's next two rulings on right to know. Using a strict
interpretation of the constitution, Sherlock said he found no basis for
a litigation exemption, and cited three reasons for his ruling:

One,

the language in Art. II, Sec. 9 is clear and unambiguous that there is
only one exemption to openness, individual privacy; two, the state
can assert no right to privacy on its own behalf — such liberties are
reserved for individuals to protect them from government, not the
other way around; and three, voiding the exemption would not, as
the state asserted, somehow require attorneys to divulge their secret
strategies. The right-to-know provision, Sherlock argued, does not
compel discussion to take place at a public m eeting, it simply
requires a quorum of any board to hold its meetings in public.114
On appeal, the Supreme Court said the M ontana Constitution
was equally clear and unambiguous: The only time the government

114Cause No. BDV-89-121.
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can consider closing its meetings is when an individual’s right to
privacy is at stake.
The court took note of two other important issues, and again
agreed with Sherlock: The Board of Education’s argument for the
right to due process “is unsound,” the court said, adding: “State
agencies have never been included under the umbrella of the right to
due process. The protections guaranteed by the constitutional right to
due process were designed to protect people from

governm ental

abuse. They were not designed to protect the government from the
people.” 115
Finally, the court said defendant's claim on the so-called public
policy issue — that the loss of privacy to discuss legal strategy would
give unfair advantage to the opposition — was nonsense. The opinion
characterized the litigation in question as "essentially a turf battle"
between the Board of Education and the governor, which should be
played out for all to see. "In short," the court said, "it is the public’s
b u sin e ss."116
With this case decided so clearly, it wasn't hard to see that soon
another Open Meetings Law exemption would fall, too.
In July 1990, the Board of Trustees of the G reat Falls Public
Schools, after months of labor negotiations with teachers and library
aides, scheduled a closed meeting for September to discuss a fact
finder's report. The Great Falls Tribune requested that the meeting
be open, and the school board agreed. However, at the September

115Supreme Court No. 89-589 at 7.
116Ibid. p. 8.

meeting no discussion

of the report took place; the
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board simply

recommended that the report be rejected, took a vote, and moved on.
The Tribune complained that private discussions

had

taken

place in the interim , in a deliberate effort by board members to
avoid

conducting

its business publicly, thus

violating

the

Open

Meetings Law and the right to know provision. The newspaper sued
in district court, and the board responded saying that an exemption
in

the

Open M eetings Law

allowed closed

m eetings

to discuss

collective bargaining issues. The district court ruled in favor of the
board, and the Tribune appealed.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the collective
bargaining exemption was an unconstitutional restriction of the right
to know. The court agreed with the Tribune that Art. II, Sec. 9
allowed a government

agency to close meetings only

for concerns

about individual privacy. This case, the court said, "does not involve
a matter of individual privacy but instead involves a public agency
desiring privacy."117
In striking down the exemption, the court said it need not
review the wording or the intent of the right to know provision. The
court noted it had addressed this issue in at least two previous
rulings, in Great Falls Tribune
Board

of Education.

v. District Court in 1980, and in AP v.

"The intent of the framers of a constitutional

provision is controlling," the court said. "We have clearly held that
Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution is unambiguous and

117Great Falls Tribune v. Great Falls Public Schools. 255 Mont.
125.

capable of interpretation from the language ... alone."118 The
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school

board asked the court to balance the right to know against what it
said was its "duty to supervise the school district" as outlined in
another constitutional provision, Article X, Section 8, which says
simply: "The supervision and control of schools in each school district
shall be vested in a board of trustees to be elected as provided by
law."
There was precedent for such a balancing of rights, the board
argued, citing an open records case — Mountain States Telephone v.
D epartm ent of Public

Service

R egulation119 --

in which the court

restricted the right to know in an effort to protect a corporation's
property rights.
But the court rejected the argument saying the telephone
com pany's property rights

were synonymous

with privacy rights,

and therefore the court had properly attempted to balance the right
of privacy against the public's right to know. This case is different,
the ruling said. "Here there is a lack of any individual privacy being
involved," the court said. In the end, the court said, "the collective
bargaining strategy is an impermissible attempt by the legislature to
extend the grounds upon which a meeting may be closed."120

118Ibid. p. 129.
119634 P.2d 181.
120255 Mont. 125. p. 131.
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Access to Records

The Montana Supreme Court has decided a half-dozen cases
involving

the public’s access to government-held inform ation.

In

th re e ,121 the court held that public boards or agencies can gather and
use certain kinds of inform ation for adm inistrative purposes, yet
withhold the information from the public. In another case,122 the
court said law enforcement agencies in Montana can legally withhold
many of their official records from the public.
In Mountain States v. Department of Public Service Regulation,
the dispute centered on the phone company’s request that its “trade
secrets” be kept from public view. The trade secrets were supplied to
the Public Service Commission (PSC) as part of a request for a phonerate increase.

The PSC refused to keep the trade secrets confidential,

saying it had a duty to share all its information with the Consumer
Counsel, a state-sponsored agency that represents consumers during
PSC rate-request deliberations.
Mountain Bell sued in district court and Judge Gordon Bennett
ruled that the right to know, coupled with state statutes covering
open records, demanded that once the PSC receives such information,
it becomes automatically available to the public.
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned, saying M ountain
B ell’s privacy rights deserved the same protection as an individual’s
121Human Rights Division v. City of Billings. 646 P.2d. (Mont.
1982). Mountain States v. Department of Public Service Regulation.
634 P.2d. 181 (Mont. 1989). Belth v. Bennett 740 P.2d. 638 (Mont.
1987).
122Engrav v. Cragun. 769 P.2d (Mont. 1989).
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privacy, effectively ruling that in Montana law, corporations are
"individuals" deserving the same protection as a private citizen. This
was an unusual and controversial ruling. It was contrary to the
intent of the framers of the right- to-know provision, who clearly
said

th at

the

individual

c o r p o r a t i o n s 123 and the
because

it

significantly

right

to

decision
expanded

privacy
worried

the

did

not

apply

constitutional

rights

to

experts

of corporations

in

M ontana law.
Finally, having ruled that the telephone company had the right
to protect its property based on the constitutional right to privacy,
the court needed a way to balance that privacy right against the
right to know.

The

court resolved

the conflict w ith

a

special

"protective order" that limited the public's access to the trade secrets.
The order said the PSC, the Consumer Counsel, and anyone else
whose “interest relates to the ratemaking function”
trade

secrets,

but that the

could review the

inform ation m ust be

kept otherw ise

confidential.
Such an arrangem ent, the court said, would give consumers
“adequate

know ledge”

to

fully

participate

in

the

com m ission’s

proceedings and yet protect the privacy/property interests

of the

co rpo ratio n .
It

was

the

first

time

the

court had

ever

issued

such

a

protective order, but it would not be the last.
In 1982, in Human Rights Division v. City of B illin g s, the court
ordered the City of Billings to turn over personnel files for evaluation

123See footnote 89.
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by the state Human Rights Division to determine if the city had
discriminated in its hiring practices.
The city had refused to open the records, claiming a

right to

privacy on behalf of its employees, and to protect itself against
liability for disclosing private information. The Supreme Court agreed
in part, saying the city employees had a reasonable expectation that
their files would be kept confidential, but it also acknowledged that
state

Human

d iscrim in atio n

Rights

D ivision

could

not

issue

w ith o u t

thoroughly

properly

evaluate

exam ining

the

em ployee

records. As a compromise, the court again issued a protective order,
saying the state could have access to the files, but m ust keep them
confidential under penalty of contempt. Human Rights v. B illin g s
wasn't the last of it. In 1987, in another case appealed from Judge
Bennett’s district court, the justices ruled one more time that a state
agency

could

keep

secret

B e n n e t t . 124 Joseph

third-party

Belth,

an

inform ation.

editor

of an

In

B elth

insurance

v.

industry

magazine, sued state auditor Andrea Bennett to obtain information
from her files about the financial condition of insurance companies
operating in Montana. That information had been supplied to the
co m m issio n er

of

in su ran ce

from

the

In su ran ce

R eg u lato ry

Judge Bennett reasoned, as he had in M ountain

S tates, that

Information System, a private firm.

once the information was held by

the government, citizens of the

state should have access to it. Further, Bennett challenged the high

124740 P.2d 638

co u rt’s earlier ruling

that corporations

had

the
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rights as

same

individuals. But the Supreme Court reversed Bennett again.
Engrav v. Cragun was an unusual records case that came before
the Supreme Court in

1989. It was presented and argued by a

U niversity of M ontana student, Barry Engrav, who was doing a
research paper intended to examine the quality of law enforcement
in Granite County. He had requested access to the Granite County
S heriffs Department daily telephone records, crim inal investigation
files, pre-employment files, and arrest records, for use in his term
paper. The sheriff, citing state code that protects police records,
refused. Engrav sued, lost in district court, and appealed.
A fter

exam ining

a

jum ble

of

sta te

codes

reg u latin g

confidentiality of police records, and relying heavily on the K a tz
"expectation of privacy" test, the Supreme Court said the privacy
rights of individuals, coupled with the need for law enforcement to
keep

investigations

secret,

outweighed

E n g rav ’s

claim

to

see

State

law

telephone logs, employee files, and criminal investigations.
A rrest

records,

however,

were

another

m atter.

specifically says arrest records are open docum ents.125 However, the
court then noted an exemption in the codes that said whenever a
record is compiled by name, only information about "convictions,
deferred

prosecutions

or deferred

sentences"

p u b lic .126

125M C A 44-503, 44-5-103(14), 44-5-301.
126M CA 44-5-301.

is

available

to

the
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The court concluded that although arrest records are open by
statute, they are also indexed by name rather than by date of arrest,
and therefore by statute, the state can keep the names confidential.
“It is important to keep the right of privacy of individuals in mind
here,” the court wrote. It then made an unusual ruling: Engrav could
have the arrest records, but could not name individuals from those
records in his research paper. Since the right to privacy provision
states that individual privacy "shall not be infringed w ithout the
showing of a com pelling state interest,"

the court declared

that

Engrav's school research project was not of sufficient state interest to
outweigh individual privacy.127
But not all names in law enforcement records could be kept
secret, the court ruled in anotherl989 case.

In Great Falls Tribune v.

Cascade Co. S h e r if f .128 the court said that police and other law
enforcem ent
disciplinary

officers

have

actions and

a

dim inished

required

police

rig h t

agencies

to

p riv acy

in

to

release

the

names of sanctioned officers.
The case began in Cascade County in 1988, when a number of
police officers and sheriffs deputies were disciplined after they were
involved in a high-speed chase and the arrest of a suspect, who was
struck while on foot by a car driven by a sh eriffs deputy. The
deputy was suspended, a Great Falls police officer fired, and two
other officers were asked to resign, which they did. The Great Falls
Tribune requested the names of the disciplined officers and was

127Engrav. 1228.
128238 Mont. 103.

refused, so the newspaper sued. After a district court ordered the
names released, the sheriff released the name of the deputy, but the
city attorney appealed the ruling on behalf of the city police officers.
The

Supreme Court traced the privacy

several cases, including M ontana

Human

E n g r a v . to establish the privacy

issue

back through

R ights. M is s o u lia n . and

standard,

but then ruled

that

although police officers may have a "subjective or actual expectation
of privacy," it was a weak right given their "positions of high public
trust."

As such, the public had a stronger right to know since issues

of "public health, safety and welfare are closely tied to an honest
police force," the court said.129
And

finally,

the

m ost recent

Associated Press v. State of

test of

governm ent records,

M ontana. 130 centered on whether an

affidavit filed with the court in connection with a criminal charge can
be kept secret. Such affidavits typically describe the facts that lead
to a felony charge and are the equivalent of an indictm ent from a
grand jury.
The issue arose in 1991, after the legislature amended the
state's

crim in al

procedure

statutes.

One

of

the

m any

amendments required that the affidavits be kept sealed

new

unless a

judge determined they should be opened to the public.
The Associated Press, 15 state newspapers, seven television
stations and several news organizations sued the state to have the
statute stricken, claiming that it violated the constitutional right to

129Ibid. 107.
130250 Mont. 299.

know.

The news

organizations bypassed

district court and
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went

directly to the Supreme Court in an effort to get a speedy ruling,
since the new law was effectively sealing affidavits all over the state.
The Supreme Court agreed that the issue was pressing, and ruled on
the case within a month after the statute became effective.
The court struck down the new law, saying it did not conform
to the constitutional right to know. In the process, the court made a
couple

of

im portant

findings.

One,

that

such

affid av its

are

"documents" of the type described in the language of Art. II, Sec. 9:
"No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents ... of
all public bodies or agencies of state government ...."

And two, the

court said the statute itself was "antithetical" to the standard of the
right to know provision. The court noted that since the days of
territorial government, the public had been allowed access to such
documents, and that such access was important to the public's faith
in the judicial system.131

Access to courts

In

two

im p o rtan t

cases

regarding

access

to

M ontana

courtrooms, the Supreme Court has ruled generally in favor of open
courts, and in one,

declared that the right-to-know provision holds

Montana to a stricter standard than does the U.S. Constitution.

131 Ibid. p. 302-303.
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In Great Falls Tribune v. District Court.132 a district court judge
granted

the

p la in tiffs

request

to

close

voir

dire

exam ination,

allowing prospective jurors to be questioned in secret about their
suitability for jury duty.
The defendant in the case, Gene Andrew Austad, had been
charged with several felony counts, including deliberate homicide,
ro b b ery ,

sexual

in terco u rse

w ithout

consent,

and

aggravated

b u rg la ry .
Before his arrest, Austad had led police on a wild automobile
chase, which ended in a wreck. Austad was permanently injured and
spent months recuperating before he was able to stand trial. The
crimes for which he was charged were particularly grisly, and the
G reat Falls Tribune and

several TV and radio stations reported

extensively on the case.
A t trial, Austad requested that the
closed,

arguing

that extensive publicity,

crim inal record and other evidence

voir dire exam ination be
including details

of his

not previously known

to the

public, threatened his right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury.
The district court, ordered by the Supreme Court to hold a special
hearing regarding the closure, concluded that the individual voir dire
proceedings should be limited to the defendent, the officers

of the

court and one prospective juror at a time. The request was based on
a presumption that the other prospective jurors could be tainted by
discussion and questions during voir dire, or by newspaper coverage,

132608 P.2d 116.
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since the defendants poor physical condition threatened to extend
voir dire for days, perhaps weeks.
The Tribune appealed,

and the Supreme Court reversed the

lower court based primarily on its reading of the right to know, and
secondarily because, the court said, "we fail to see ju st how closing
such

exam ination

to

the

public

is

necessary

to

guarantee the

defendant a fair trial."
In his opinion, Chief Justice Frank Haswell referred
controversial

U.S.

Suprem e

Court case,

G annett

Co..

to a
Inc. v.

D e P a s q u a le .133 which had upheld a "common law rule" of open civil
and criminal trials in America.

G a n n e t t , as noted earlier, was

controversial, in part, because it also said courts could shut down
pre-trial suppression hearings

because they w eren't necessarily part

of the trial. Legal experts found the case confusing, and some worried
whether G an n ett allowed judges in certain circumstances to close the
trial itself.
In any case, Haswell cited language from G a n n e tt that traced
the

benefits

of public

trials,

inquisitional techniques"

and

which included

preventing

unjust prosecutions.

"secret

A closed

trial

breeds suspicion and mistrust, Haswell said.134
The court reviewed media coverage of A ustad’s arrest and
alleged crimes, and found it "factual ... without editorializing" and "no
more

inflam m atory"

than

routine

reporting

on

any

other

brutal

crime. There was nothing in the reporting or in the prospect of open

13399 S.Ct. 2898 (1979)
134Trihune v. Dist. Ct. at 438.
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voir dire that would jeopardize Austad's right to a speedy and fair
trial, Haswell wrote.
In the final

analysis,

though, H asw ell moved

away

from

G a n n e tt. 135 and federal precedent. Rather, he said, the M ontana
C onstitution's

right-to-

know

provision

provides

the

strongest

possible argument for open court proceedings, which included voir
dire. In fact, he argued, Art. II, Sec. 9 imposes a "stricter standard"
than does federal law and "clearly provides that any person has the
constitutional right to observe court proceedings unless the demand
of

in d iv id u al

privacy

clearly

exceeds

the

m erits

of

public

d isclo su re."136
That right not being absolute, Haswell acknowledged that if
during

voir dire

it

becam e

necessary

to

discuss

p o ten tially

inadmissible evidence, the judge may briefly close voir dire.
Haswell's argument was a blend of dem ocratic traditions and
the strong language in the Montana Constitution, which, he said,
required

the state courts to go further than the federal

required. His conclusion: Openness is critical

to the

Constitution
quality and

integrity of the judicial process. Along the way he gave a strong nod

135Haswell joined those who found G annett confusing, and
hinted that alternative interpretations were likely: "Although it is not
entirely clear, there is reason to believe that the holding in G a n n e tt
may not be applicable to closure of the trial itself," Haswell wrote.
Haswell held, of course, that voir dire is part of the trial. Also, he
likely had one eye trained on Richmond Newspapers , which was
being argued at the Supreme Court, and he may have been confident
that the high court would rule criminal trials open to the public.
136Tribune v. Dist. Ct. at 438.

to free speech

and the right to know.

"Closure,"
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he wrote, "is

censorship at the source — a denial of the right to know."137
Within two years, the Montana Supreme Court had ruled again
in favor of access to the courtroom in The

State of Montana ex. rel.

Smith v. D istrict Court.138 A Great Falls man, Daniel Smith, asked the
Supreme Court to intervene and reverse a district court ruling that
his pretrial submission hearing should be open to the public.
Smith, who was charged with deliberate homicide, claimed he
was unlawfully

arrested

and that he andhis home were illegally

searched without a warrant or his consent. Before his trial in district
court, a pretrial hearing was scheduled to determine what, if any,
evidence from the search was admissable during the trial. Smith
asked that the hearing be closed, contending publicity about possible
"tainted evidence" could prejudice potential jurors. The judge denied
Smith’s request, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court considered two issues: W hether the press
and the public could be excluded from a pretrial suppression hearing
to ensure the right to a fair trial, and, if the hearing could be closed,
what standard should the court use?
This time, a 1982 U.S. case, Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior
C o u rt.139 provided some guidance. G lobe allowed closure of portions
of a crim inal trial during testimony of minors who were alleged
victims of sex crimes, but it also established that the public and the
press have a constitutional right of access to courts under the First
137Ib id .
138654 P.2d 982.
139102 S,Ct, 2613 (1982).

and

F ourteenth

T r ib u n e

Am endm ents.

opinion

Equally

influential
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H asw ell's

was

that said the M ontana C onstitution

required

a

stricter standard for openness.
State ex. rel. Smith v. D istrict

Court went to some lengths to

balance two fundamental constitutional rights: the right to know and
the right to a fair trial.
The court sought to establish a standard for allowing closure
that infringed as little as possible on public access. In framing the
issues, Justice Frank Morrison said the right-to-know provision in the
Montana Constitution and the right of access outlined in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution argued strongly for
open

proceedings.

M orrison

also ruled that

suppression

hearings

were part of the trial itself, and could not be considered separate.
Thus, he said, a judge in Montana could close a suppression
hearing only if the resulting publicity could create a "clear and
present danger" to the fairness of the trial, and then only if the judge
could find "no reasonable alternative means" to avoid the effects of
the publicity.
The ruling detailed how the courts should discover a clear and
present danger, suggesting judges consider, for example, "empirical
evidence"

of

new spaper

readership

and

"expert

p sy ch o lo gical

testimony" about "the capacity of an individual to disregard pretrial
publicity." Morrison also suggested judges attem pt to avoid the clear
and present danger altogether by enlisting the media's cooperation
not to publicize details from the suppression hearing until after the
jury

is empaneled. And finally, he instructed judges to consider
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alternatives such as a change of venue for the trial, sequestering the
potential jurors, and even

special instructions. M orrision

these

from

guidelines

directly

the

A m erican

B ar

adopted

A ssociation

standards for resolving conflicts between access and trial fairness.
In all, the decision leans in favor of keeping pretrial hearings
open if possible, but Morrison made it clear: The right to a trial by an
impartial jury is a right to be balanced against the right to know; the
right to know is not absolute.

An a l y s i s

W henever the Montana Supreme Court examined the right to
know as it conflicted with another constitutional liberty, it sought a
balance that reasonably satisfied both liberties. In cases where the
right to know conflicted with statutory protections, the court used a
variety of methods to evaluate the strength of the right to know.
With either approach, it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff sought
access to records, meetings or the courts. As such, it may be more
helpful to analyze these cases with less emphasis on what type of
access was being sought, and more emphasis on the court's methods.
First some general observations:
1.

The Supreme Court has said repeatedly in access cases that

its interpretation of the right to know or of related statutes would
rely on the plain meaning of the words, and that it needn't pursue
"extrinsic methods of interpretation" if the language was clear.140
W here government agencies have attempted to justify secrecy based
on any other interpretation, the court has been adamant: Bureaucrats
may not deny public access for purposes of expediency or personal
comfort or some other ad hoc public policy reason. The court has said
repeatedly that the only exemption in the right-to-know provision is
individual privacy. It has also said, however, that the right to a fair
trial — which is not part of the language of Art. II, Sec, 9 — can
trump the right to know. In short, any arguments for denying public
140See G.F. Tribune v. G.F. Public Schools. Also Keller v. Smith.
170 Mont. 399, State v. Cardwell. 187 Mont. 370, G.F. Tribune v.
District Court. AP v. Board of Education.
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access are suspect if they aren't grounded in the rights to privacy or
fair trial.
2. Where an argument for individual privacy is

the basis for

denying access, the court also has been fairly consistent in its
approach. The "reasonable expectation of privacy test" has been the
prim ary tool for determining a privacy interest, and the court has
routinely used a balancing test to resolve conflicts between a right to
privacy and a right to know.
That is not to say that the court has applied the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test appropriately in each instance. In at least
one im portant case, M ountain

States v. Dept, of Public Service

R e g u la tio n , the application of the K atz test may have resulted in an
unnecessary

clash

between

the right to know

and

the right to

privacy. And finally, the court has not, in my view, established a
workable standard for determining how strong the right to privacy
is. As a result, the court has said, for example, that police officers,
because

of

dim inished

their
right

because of their

im portant
of

positions

p riv ac y ,141

and

of
that

public

tru st,

university

have

a

presidents,

important positions of public trust, do not.142

3. The court has ruled that the public should have broad access
to courtrooms based on the few cases so far. The right to know
provision, the court has said, holds the state to an even stricter
standard for openness than does the federal law. Moreover, in cases
where the right to privacy or the right to a fair trial is jeopardized by

141G.F. Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff.
142Missoulian v. Board of Regents.
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publicity, the court has said that Montana judges must use the least
restrictive means possible to protect such rights, and must consider
any number of alternatives to keep the courtroom open. Only after
those alternatives have been exhausted may a judge close portions of
a trial or related trial hearings.

The cases: A closer look

In two open meetings cases — Y e llo w s to n e and J a ru s s i — the
facts are simple, and the violations clear. The cases make the lesson
equally clear for bureaucrats, agencies and supervisory boards: The
right to know coupled with the Open M eetings Law make it the
government’s duty to open business to the public at all times, unless
individual privacy is threatened, and to follow the law that requires
sufficient public notice about when and where meetings will be held.
By ordering the commissioners in Yellowstone County to redo
th eir

m eeting

and

vote

again,

the

court

said

im p licitly

that

government agencies must not sidestep the democratic process in the
interests of expediency. Participation must be full, or the system is
not truly democratic. The court in both cases quoted from the rightto-know provision:

“No person shall be deprived of the right ... to

observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies ... ."

In

the three cases that challenged statutory exemptions to the open
meetings law — Associated Press v. Board of Public Education. G .F .
Tribune v. G.F. Public Schools and Associated Press v. State — the
court was equally clear: Unless the exemption deals with individual
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privacy, it is unconstitutional on its face. In all three cases, the court
maintained a strict interpretation of the Constitution. In two of the
three cases the court deferred to the framers and their explicit desire
that the legislature not make exemptions beyond what is allowed by
the plain language of the right to know provision.
These cases, however, represent only three challenges to the
dozens of

statutes that regulate access to information collected and

controlled by state agencies. As others are challenged, will they stand
or be stricken? These cases suggest a couple of possibilities.
One view says that if the statutes are not grounded in some
privacy interest, they are presumably unconstitutional. In A sso c ia te d
Press v. State, the court investigated the legislative record to see if
lawmakers, when they passed the statute sealing the affidavits, were
concerned about the defendant's privacy. It found no such legislative
intent, and partly on that finding, ruled the law unconstitutional.
In another view, the court has shown it can create a right to
privacy where none was intended by the framers. The court said in
M ountain

States that trade secrets are a property right and a privacy

right that corporations and private citizens share equally, thereby
extending the right of privacy to a corporation. But the framers
explicitly said the language in the privacy exemption in the right to
know did not to apply to corporations. Nonetheless, after M o u n ta in
S ta te s , corporations can now claim the right to individual privacy to
protect property. By this standard, records that contain proprietary
information gathered by the state Board of Oil and Gas Conservation,

7°
for example, may well be inaccessible to the public based on a
privacy exemption.
Finally, public policy unrelated to the right to privacy may
protect some government-held information according to the ruling in
E n g r a v . While

G reat Falls

unconstitutional

to

seal

Tribune and AP v. State suggest it is

records

w ithout

an

individual

privacy

finding, Chief Justice Turnage said in E n g ra v that "public policy of
this state cannot permit" the release of law enforcement files related
to ongoing crim inal investigations.143 Opening such records to the
public

would

damage

"law

enforcem ent security,"

Turnage

said.

While E ngrav did not challenge directly the statute that protects such
files,

Turnage

clearly

suggests

the

court

would

consider

arguments besides individual privacy to prevent public
som e

other

access to

government records.
But the remark in E n g ra v is far from doctrine, and the court's

overall record seems to suggest that statutes not grounded partly or
wholly in a constitutional liberty are suspect.

Right to Know v. Right

In

to Privacy

several cases from the early 1980s, the court used balancing

tests to resolve conflicts between two fundam ental rights in the
Constitution — the right to know and the right to privacy. One —
M is s o u lia n — was an open meetings case;
records.

The

state

Constitution

143769 P.2d 1224 at 1227.

the rest tested access to

expressly considers

the rig h t

to
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privacy in two places: an exemption for privacy is part of the right to
know provision, and Art. II, Sec. 10 makes privacy a fundamental
right: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of
a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
com pelling state interest."144
These access cases raise a number of im portant issues and
suggest some trends in the court's thinking. Any analysis, however,
may be more meaningful with a brief review of the right to privacy
and its development in U.S. and Montana political history.
U niversity

of M ontana professor and constitutional expert

Larry Elison and a University of Montana Law School graduate,
Dennis Nettik-Simmons, traced the history of the right to privacy in a
1987 Montana Law Review article.145 Privacy by definition, and "[i]n
the broadest context possible" is "the right to be let alone by other
persons as well as by the government," they wrote.
Modern privacy rights are rooted in part in the natural law
concepts

developed

by John Locke, the authors

say. Locke,

as

indicated in the first chapters here, argued that property rights were
an extension of an individual's ownership of himself: "[E]very man
has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but
h im self."146
Such an interpretation, Elison argues, "sheds some light on what
the courts, for nearly a century, have been calling privacy." In U.S.

144Montana Constitution. Art. II, Sec. 10.
145"Right of Privacy." Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 (1987).
146Locke, Second Treatise of Government. (Thomas Reardon ed,
1952) (1st ed. London 1690).
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law ,

the

right

to privacy

is

generally

linked

to

the

Fourth

Amendment ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects ... .") and was developed as a eommon-law
right in the opinions of Justice Louis Brandeis in the

1920s.147

Several Supreme Court decisions helped establish a general right to
privacy, most notably W olf v. Colorado148 in 1949, Mapp v. Ohio149 in
1961, Griswold v. Connecticut150 in 1965, and most important for this
discussion, Katz v. United States151 in 1969.
By 1972, when the Constitutional Convention established the
right to privacy in the new constitution, Elison says, the concept had
been recognized by the state Supreme Court for 50 years. Privacy
rights

in

case

law were

applied

typically

to

search-and-seizure

issues, Elison said, but the constitutional convention transcript makes
it clear the drafters intended the right also to

"protect citizens from

illegal private action and from legislation and governmental practices
that interfered with their autonomy to make decisions in matters
that are generally considered private."152
This is
inherently

essentially

what Locke

argued,

th at

people

are

individuals and no one has a right to control your person

or your property.

147See Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1927) Brandeis
d issen t.
148338 U.S. 25.
149367 U.S. 643.
150381 U.S. 479.
151389 U.S. 347.
152Elison, "Right of Privacy." p. 13.

Individual

autonomy,

however, under the

um brella

73
of "the

right to be let alone," doesn't go far enough to describe privacy at
issue in the M ontana cases.

Thomas Huff, University o f Montana

professor or philosophy and law, outlines what he calls "the privacy
norm," a concept that embraces our most intimate activities, thoughts
or conversations.153 The government or the press — or any intruding
entity, for that matter — invades privacy when it takes "an interest
in what we are doing, in how we are conducting our lives, or in what
we are saying." The intrusion becomes unwarranted, Huff says, when
someone is "in the position of knowing things about us which he or
she should not know."
The invasion is compounded, then, by further disclosure of
inform ation

— about,

say,

sex

lives,

m edical

history,

intim ate

friendships, and so on — allowing others to make judgm ents about
us.

The potential damage, of course, is generally to reputations and

occasionally personal wealth.

Our privacy is invaded, Huff explains,

"because we are treated as the potential objects of others' gratuitous
evaluations rather than as persons."
This allows the "right to be let alone" to be seen in two distinct
ways:

One is a kind of privacy that allows us to be free from others

gaining and distributing infomormation about our actions, thoughts,
and behavior, and the second is a kind of privacy that protects us
from government interfering with our decisions about our private

153Huff, Thomas, 55 Washington Law Review. 1980. H uffs
analysis criticizes the court for failing to distinguish between types of
privacy, leaving a legacy of confusion over how to evaluate privacy
rig h ts.
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conduct. One speaks to what people know about us; the other to our
autonomous choices about such things as relationships, m arriage,
birth control, religious beliefs, etc.

which have the least to do with —

or impact on — others outside our private spheres of home, family
and relationships.
In Montana, the Supreme Court cases since 1972 reviewed
here

centered

on

disclosure

of inform ation,

and

thus

"norm

of

privacy" cases by H uffs definition. In each, the court applied the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" concept from K atz, which, Elison
says, has become the "primary if not the sole method" of establishing
a right of privacy by the Montana Supreme Court. And in each, the
test helped the court determine that a right of privacy existed.
But K atz

guided the court only in fin d in g

a right to privacy. In

most access cases, the court has used a "balancing test" to weigh the
right to privacy against the right to know. The question becomes,
then, whether the court's overall approach properly values the right
to know, given the framers' intent that the courts lean in favor of the
rig h t

to

know

w henever

the

two

rig h ts

c o n flic te d .

Such

considerations provide a helpful framework to analyze some of the
cases.
In Human

Rights

D ivision, the court said personnel records

deserved protection, and few disagree that such files are generally
kept confidential and are rarely made public — they often contain
detail that would allow, as Huff outlined, others to make possibly
unw arranted judgm ents,

and the kind of inform ation

that people

value for its privacy. Yet the court recognized that the state had a
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logical and sufficient reason to inspect the files to determine whether
the city of Billings was discriminating against certain employees. In
the interests of public policy, the court found a utilitarian solution: It
issued a special protective order restricting circulation of the files to
members

of the

Human

Rights D ivision,

thereby

protecting

the

privacy o f the individuals, and allowing controlled access to the
information by a state agency that claimed a need.
Human Rights Division was perhaps a logical decision in a case
which offered few easy alternatives. All parties seemed to get what
they wanted, and the expectation of privacy was one that m ost in
society may
R ig h ts

find reasonable. Nonetheless, the resolution of H u m a n

presumes a measure of trust in governm ent that some in

society may be unwilling to grant. Who, after all, will be monitoring
the Human Rights Division to guard against abuse? In that sense, the
case institutionalizes secrecy in a manner that conflicts with the
sentiments of political theorists like Meiklejohn, who argued that no
pertinent information should be withheld from citizens, and M ill,
who argued

that proper self-government never granted powers to

government beyond which the individuals had themselves.
The case has other notable dimensions, as well. For one, H u m an
Rights

D ivision marked the first time that the court said that a third

party could

assert the privacy rights of an

individual (HRD was

ordered under penalty of contempt to keep third-party information
private).

Two, it was also the first time a special protective order

was used in combination with both the K atz test and the balancing
test to resolve a right-to-know case.
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It wasn't long before the court applied the same combination to
another access case — M ountain

S ta te s. This tim e, with more

troublesome results. As noted, the legacy of M ountain States is that it
extended individual privacy rights to a corporation. Elison argues
that the debate

transcripts clearly

show that the drafters

never

intended individual privacy to be applied to corporations.
One could argue that it was a Lockean view that led the
Supreme Court to extend privacy rights as it did in M ountain

S tates.

If, as Locke proposed, property and liberty are roughly synonymous,
then the court could logically argue, as it did in M ountain
trade

secrets

are

"property"

deserving

protection

and

States, that
that

the

telephone company as owners of that property should be treated the
same as an individual would be treated under similar circumstances.
B ut this

does

not mean,

nor

should

it mean,

that

a faceless

corporation should be protected under the "privacy norm," as Huff
describes it, and all that it encompasses.
Further, that aspect of M ountain

S tates

could

have been

avoided had the court considered a different approach that would
have yielded a greater victory for openness and avoided the issue of
privacy rights altogether. For example, if the court would have
considered the trade secrets simply a "good" rather than a liberty,
and resolved it in the same manner as any similar instance when the
government takes property from its citizens: Simply reimburse them
for any financial losses that occur.

Thus the justices could have upheld the lower court,
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declared

the records open for public inspection, trade secrets and all, and
simply ordered the state to make restitution, if necessary.
As it stands, the ruling partially and unnecessarily

blocks

citizen access to an im portant process: monitoring state regulated
monopolistic practices. As Elison further argues, "This is precisely the
kind of public agency deliberation the constitutional provision (of the
right to know) intended to allow the citizenry to observe."154
Finally, had the court ruled in this fashion, then the decision to
grant "individual" status to a corporation would never have arisen,
and the court could have preserved the intent of the framers that
only true individuals could assert the right to privacy.

Missoulian & Engrav: Bad cases, bad law

The impact of Missoulian v. Board of Regents is significant, and
for many

in the press, dismaying. For one, it was the first test under

the new Constitution that required the court to balance individual
privacy against the right to know.

Second, it tested the privacy

rights of one of the m ost public citizens in the state: A university
presid en t

whose

perform ance

is

of

great

public

in terest

and

importance. Unfortunately, the decision appears to have closed off all
access to this evaluation process, which journalists and others fear
may exclude the public from important discussions elsewhere — at

154Elison, "Right of Privacy." p. 48.
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school boards or whenever highly placed public officials claim a right
to privacy during an evaluation of their performance.
This decision was also contrary to the framers’ intentions

about

how the right to privacy should be applied. Delegate Dorothy Eck,
speaking for the right to know committee, said the drafters feared
the privacy exemption might

be used to improperly exclude the

public from im portant discussions about how governm ent officials
performed, again, making the distinction between information that is
im portant to the autonomy of an individual and inform ation that is
important to the functioning of a democracy.155
She specifically referred to instances when it may be necessary
to dismiss an "agency head" or other officials in "local school board
situations, local government situations, and many others."

It was

with this in mind that the committee carefully worded the exemption
to say the demands of privacy must

"clearly" exceed the merits of

public disclosure.
The court could have approached M issoulian differently. To see
how, it is helpful to look at Elison’s criticism of the K atz test itself.
In his evaluation of privacy rights and his criticism of K a tz .
E lison

says

the

test overem phasizes

an individual's

"subjective"

expectation of privacy. Elison quotes Supreme Court Justice Harlan,
who devised the two-part test in K atz and who later in a dissent
warned that the test "should not be overly em phasized."

Harlan

worried that an individual's expectations of privacy are often little
more than "reflections" of the status quo rather than a standard for

155Con Con of 1971-72. Vol. V, Verbatim Transcript, 1670-71.
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what information ought to be protected.156 Harlan's thinking has an
application to M isso u lia n . Where did Bowers' expectation of privacy
originate? He was advised by the regents when he was appointed
that his performance evaluations would be confidential. As such, his
"expectation of privacy" was

rooted in status-quo policies, which

largely reflect practices in the private sector where job performance
reviews are typically part of an employee's confidential files.
Even in the public sector, it is commonly acknowledged that
regents boards, school boards, and myriad other boards and agencies
prefer the comfort of private conversations where participants are
free to speak as they wish and not be held accountable in the press.
It is also a natural impulse to resist publicity when a performance
evaluation is critical or negative.
But it is precisely such a circumstance — an evaluation of a
public servant whose performance may be inadequate, or at least
questionable — for which the right to know was intended. However
uncomfortable it may be for university presidents,
or

agency

directors,

they

m ust

in

a

school principals

dem ocratic

system

b e

accountable to the people who entrusted them with their position.
And,

as Locke

said,

that trust is preserved

only

if pow er

of

government is retained by the people and not turned over to the
b u re a u c ra ts .157 The intent of the Montana Open Meetings Law also
speaks directly to this issue:

"The people of the state do not wish to

abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them."

The

156See U.S. v. White. 401 U.S. 745, 768. (1971).
157Locke, Second Treatise. Sect. 141. (ed. P. Laslett) Cambridge.

right to know

should

allow citizens to observe when
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a school

superintendent or a sim ilar public servant is under fire, delegate
Dorothy Eck said at the Constitutional Convention.
Instead, the court in M is s o u lia n

fashioned an argum ent for

safety, comfort, ease and convenience, and, on one hand, blurred the
distinction

between

truly

private

inform ation

and the

kind

of

discussion that should be open in order to make democracy function
better.

On the other hand, the court failed to heed Harlan's warning

about missapplying K atz. In M isso u lian .
of-privacy

test

wrongly

em phasized

the reasonable-expectation-

a subjective

expectation

of

privacy and blinded the court to more important democratic values.
The court also missed at least one other opportunity to speak
up

for

open

governm ent.

A fter

determ ining

that the

rig h t

to

individual privacy applied in M is s o u lia n . the

court then failed

to

properly value that right. It rejected reasoning

from the newspaper

that a university president, as a highly visible and trusted public
servant, should not enjoy the full privacy rights of an ordinary
citizen. Rather, the court seemed to say that university presidents
may even have an enhanced

right to privacy: "Indeed the sensitive

nature of the presidential function suggests that there is all the more
reason to expect confidentiality in presidential evaluations."158
Thus, once the court determined that Bowers' right to privacy
was strengthened by his position, it was unsurprising that the final
balancing of rights swung against the right to know. The court
further rejected

a compromise

suggested

by the M issoulian

158Missoulian v. Board of Regents. 207 Mont. 513, 526.

that
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some portions of the review process could remain open to the public
without violating Bowers' individual privacy.

The language and tone

of this decision seems contradictory to the long-held view by the
court

— and

the

intent

of

the

fram ers

— that

openness

in

government is highly valued, and that the government should take
the least restrictive means to protect privacy.
It

may

be

a

final

irony

that

follow ing

the

closed-door

evaluations of several university system presidents, regent President
Ted James said that, in his opinion, m ost of the annual review
sessions could have been open to the public with little harm to
a n y o n e .159
The E ngrav case is perhaps the most difficult to analyze, in part
because the plaintiffs request was so broad, and in part because the
opinion reviewed a large number of statutes in an effort to respond.
A larger problem, perhaps, is that Engrav represented him self before
the court, and failed in many ways to argue the appropriate points of
law. His broad requests for information -- phone logs, radio call
records,

files

the

sheriff

com piled

in

hiring

law

enforcem ent

personnel, crim inal investigation files, and arrest records -- were
based on a general argument that all the records were necessary to
adequately assess the quality of law enforcement in Granite County.
W hile his intentions were praiseworthy, and his logic defensible,
Engrav

failed

to

challenge

directly

the

co n stitutionality

o f the

individual statutes that prevented his access to the records. Engrav
argued that, in addition to the constitutional right to know provision,

159Ibid at 517.
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state statute 2-6-102, MCA, set the standard for access. The statute
says that "every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any
public writings of this state."
Sheriff Cragun responded that the statutes in the M ontana Criminal
Justice Information Act of 1979 governed the release of information.
More specifically, Cragun argued, 44-5-103, MCA, defines "public
crim inal ju stice

inform ation"

convictions, deferred

as

court records

and

proceedings,

sentences, postconviction proceedings,

initial

offense reports and arrest records, bail records, daily jail rosters and
statistical information that does not identify specific individuals.
The

ju stices

sided

with

the

G ranite

C ounty

sheriff

and

considered Engrav's arguments in the specific context of a statute
defining "public criminal justice information."

On the broader issue

of whether the individual right to privacy of people whose names
existed in the files Engrav sought outweighed the public's right to
k n o w , 160

the justices

applied

the

K a tz

test

and

ruled

that

(presumably all) citizens who call the police on crim inal m atters
"have an actual expectation of privacy."
who

are

arrested

incarceration"

but subsequently

deserve

privacy

The court also said persons

released

because

"w ithout charges

such

people

"m ust

or
be

protected from public persecution."161
In the interests of public policy, then, the court declared as
constitutional a string of law enforcement statutes that restrict the
public's access, and in so doing granted a broad blanket of privacy

160Engrav v. Cragun. 769 P.2d 1224 at 1225.
161 Ibid at 1228.
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for entire groups of people without careful examination o f the kind
of privacy it was protecting.
Further, the court also accepted common police arguments that
opening

records

investigations.

to

the

public

would

cripple

law

"[P]ublic policy .... cannot permit"

enforcem ent

the release

of

ongoing criminal investigations, the court said (it never mentioned
closed

criminal investigations), adding that opening

such records

would have a "disastrous effect" on police officers' ability to perform
their duties.
Finally, of course, Engrav gained access to arrest records which
are listed in the statute as "public information," but astoundingly was
prohibited

from reporting

individual names

from

the

records,

a

practice common in the press and protection highly valued in a
society

that is rightly

harassm ent or false

sensitive to abuse of authority, including

arrest by police

or

other law

enforcem ent

officials.
That issue raises questions about another aspect of E n g rav : The
court’s interpretation of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.
Is it reasonable to presume, in a society in which the press routinely
and

thoroughly

reports

on

crim inal

activity,

and

in

w hich

we

routinely scrutinize police activities to guard against abuse, and in
which we are guaranteed the right to face our accusers, that people
seriously and generally expect privacy when making contact with
their local law enforcement agencies? One might as easily argue that
citizens

actually

expect

to

be

publicly

identified,

form ally

or

informally, as a result of their contact with the law. One might also
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argue that any citizens who believe themselves to be the subject of
police abuse may well want the protection provided by publicity. A
broader view, based on

the idea that access to information may in

fact improve government, m ight suggest that the w hole area of
confidential law enforcement records should be re-examined.
Another troubling aspect of E ngrav is the court's notion that an
attem pt by any citizen — whether doing a student research paper or
not — to critique the quality of law enforcement isn’t a compelling
endeavor that

warrants a measure of constitutional protection.

The watchdog role of citizens over their government agencies
is firmly established in American democracy. Where better to spend
energy and time than analyzing whether local police and sheriff's
departments are responding appropriately to reported crim es, using
adequate

investigative

procedures, hiring

quality

em ployees,

and

establishing "standards that taxpaying citizens were entitled to ?"162
The court failed to acknowledge, even incidentally, the fundamental
value, much less the right, of citizens to inform themselves in order
to

guard

against

im provem ent.
trivializes

governm ent abuse, or to

C h ief

E ngrav's

Ju stice
efforts

T urnage's
and

insults

aid

in

governm ent’s

co ndescending

language

his

approach.

academ ic

"A ppellant wishes to do a study for a school research project,"
Turnage wrote. "[Tjhis is not a sufficient state interest."163
Finally, though the court in several privacy cases leaned clearly
in

favor of openness

162Ibid at 1225.
163Ibid at 1229.

by applying

what it considered

the

least
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restrictive means of protecting privacy, it veered off in the opposite
direction in E n g ra v and M is s o u lia n . While neither of these cases
suggest a new direction for the court, they at least leave confusion
about what the standard is for balancing privacy against the right to
know .
Here apply H uffs norm of privacy. Does Missoulian and Engrav
represent the "norm of privacy" type intrusion? Is this information
that we truly desire to keep private so that others don’t unfairly or
g ratu ito u sly judge us? In M issoulian, I would
because

by

the

nature

of Bowers' position,

he

argue no, partly
would

enjoy

a

diminished right here. And if it did, again, the process could have
been designed to protect Bowers "norm of privacy."

In Engrav,

clearly the court was worried that publicity may cause unwarranted
judgments about some individuals whose privacy was invaded.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, one question remains:

Do the citizens of

M ontana enjoy the fullest advantage of their unique constitutional
p ro v isio n ?
In its many rulings on the right to know, the Supreme Court
has only occasionally endorsed the fullest m easure of access to
governm ent-held information.

And it has occasionally ignored the

plain words and clear intentions of the men and women who framed
the right to know in Montana's Constitution.
Yet, some good things
court has focused more on

have happened, especially where the
government process, and less on the

natural tension between the right to know and the right to privacy.
The state's Open Meetings Law has been strengthened as

the

court stripped away unconstitutional exemptions. M eetings generally
m ust be open and bureaucrats can't exclude the public to discuss
litigation

or collective

bargaining

provision says, individual privacy is

strategy.

As the right-to-know

the only exception. Courtrooms,

too, generally must be open, as the court has rightly woven together
the American tradition of openness in crim inal m atters with the
strong

language

of

the

M ontana

C onstitution.

W ith

refreshing

eloquence, the justices embraced the rewards of open courtrooms:
trust and integrity, fairness and justice.
Beyond these easier cases, however, where the court wrestled
more directly with the conflict between individual privacy and open
86

government, it
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left a legacy of inconsistent reasoning and troubling

conclusions.
For example, the court has emphasized in several cases that it
was required to rely on the plain language of the constitution, the
statutes and the framers' intent to interpret the right to know and
individual privacy.
But when the framers said they clearly intended individual
privacy

to apply to people and not corporations, the court in

M ountain

S tates ignored

the framers’ intent (in fact there is no

indication in the case that the court reviewed the transcripts of the
C onstitutional

Convention

for

guidance)

and

granted

individual

privacy status to a corporation.
When the framers said the language of the privacy exemption
was designed to make sure the public w ouldn't be shut out of
meetings in which important public matters would be discussed, the
court in M isso u lia n closed public access to evaluations of university
p re sid e n ts.
The court itself said a public servant — a university president - in a position of high public trust enjoys an enhanced right to
priv acy ,

and

th at

such

a

status

may

actually

im prove

job

performance. Then the court said that a public servant — a police
officer — in a position of high public trust

enjoyed a diminished

right to privacy, and that such a status actually improves his job
p erfo rm an ce.
Though the statute and political tradition suggest that open
arrest records

protect

the

public

from

potential

abuse

by

law

enforcem ent agencies, the court in E n g r a v
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refused to allow the

publication of names of individuals arrested in Granite County.
Clearly, in these more complex cases, the justices have strayed
off course. What makes them do so?

At least two factors seem

significant: One, the court has yet to find a workable standard for
evaluating privacy, and two, the justices seem easily swayed by the
reasonable and persuasive arguments for expedient public policy.
Most of the privacy cases — M is s o u lia n . E n g r a v . M o u n ta in
S tates. G.F. Tribune v. Cascade County
public

had

a strong

interest:

-- involved issues in which the

The perform ance

of

a university

president, the rates for a regulated monopoly, and criminal activities
within a community. In none of the cases did the court attem pt to
clarify what is truly personal privacy -- issues involving health,
fam ily, personal finance, and the like — and privacy that public
officials or corporations simply desired in the interests of efficiency,
expediency or public policy. In M is s o u lia n . for example, the court
stubbornly refused to distinguish between the two, and recognized a
broad right to privacy that overrode the right to know. In G .F .
T r i b u n e , the court recognized a narrower right to privacy
properly said the right to know outweighed it. In M ountain

and

S tates, a

right to privacy was virtually invented, contrary to the fram ers'
intent. In E n g ra v . the court cited broad public policy reasons for
extenting privacy protection to unknown and unnamed citizens, none
of whom requested it.
Is it unfair to ask the court for a clearer standard for when a
right to privacy applies, and how it should be valued?
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Issues of public policy have, in some instances, held greater
sway on the court than the plain language of the law or the framers’
intentions.
M is s o u lia n

Clearly, in two of the worst rulings -- E n g ra v and
— the court was persuaded that public servants' jobs

would be made easier and their performance enhanced by shutting
off public access. In neither case did the court appear to give serious
consideration to the more worthy arguments for open government,
nor did it seriously attempt to weigh the value of openness in a
democracy or how secrecy can erode the trust of its citizens. In fact,
implicit in some of the decisions is an onerous notion that citizens
should be satisfied with a certain level of b lin d

trust in government

leaders. Regents, sheriffs and the public service regulators, these
opinions suggest, can operate at a level beyond mere trustees of the
people.

By these rulings, public officials gain undue power by their

rarified

access to inform ation. And because average citizens

are

denied that same information, bureaucrats have another advantage:
they escape full accountability to the people they serve.
At another level, these decisions parallel some of the less
flattering proposals of some of the 18th and 19th century political
thinkers.

Though Locke and M ill, for exam ple, proposed ways

democracies can protect themselves from the tyranny of the rulers,
their elitism and intellectual arrogance prompted some undemocratic
ideas.

Both philosophers rationalized ways

some

from

having

equal

benefits

and

society could exclude
pow er

in

governm ent.

U nfortunately, the M ontana Supreme Court has occasionally taken
the same view: Opinions in M isso u lia n . E n g ra v . M ountain States and
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other cases, allowed an elite few access to information, from which
they m ust make decisions presumably in the interests of all. The rest
are left not only ignorant, but expected to trust a governm ent that
itself has been made less accountable.
Alexander Meiklejohn preached a democratic gospel that was
purer. "If by suppression," he once said, "we attempt to avoid lesser
evils, we create greater evils."
When suppression limits citizens' access to information, it shifts
the balance of freedom from the governed to the governors, which is
precisely the "greater evil" Meiklejohn feared.
Meiklejohn was critical of all efforts to balance the right to
inform ation against some other societal interests, and thus would
have disapproved of such efforts by the Montana Supreme Court. The
search for information, he said, is not an ordinary activity that we
should bargain away. "When men decide to be self-governed, to take
control of their behavior, the search for truth is not merely one of a
number of interests which may be 'balanced,' on equal terms, against
one

another.

In

that

enterprise,

the

attem pt

to

know

and

to

understand has a unique status, a unique authority, to which all
other activities are subordinated."
If we fail to recognize that uniqueness, M eiklejohn contended,
we fail to recognize the importance of individuals in democracy and
we diminish their freedom.
"It is 'we' and not 'they' that must be free," he said. "If we
break

down

that

basic

distinction

we

have

lost

sight

of

the

responsibilities and the dignity of a 'citizen'. We have failed to see
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the role which public intelligence plays in the life of a democracy. We
have

made

im possible

the

understanding

and

the

teaching

of

government by consent of the governed."
It is against this argument that the court’s various attempts to
p ro tect

public

policy

interests

and

lim it

citizen s'

inform ation can be viewed. In M is s o u lia n . M ountain

access

to

S ta te s, and

E n g ra v . the justices failed to properly consider the "greater evil" of
eroding citizens' right to search for truth, and sought to balance that
right against the significantly weaker interests of public policy.
One only need ask a few rhetorical questions to bring this
issue into clearer light: In M is s o u lia n . which is the greater harm,
allowing ordinary citizens to observe the performance evaluation of a
university president, or limiting citizens' access to inform ation that
better allows them to hold public servants accountable? In M o u n ta in
S ta te s , is the harm in revealing a corporation’s trade secrets equal to
the danger of excluding ordinary citizens from a democratic process
that allows them to make fully informed decisions? In E n g r a v . is
protecting the names of individuals who show up on police blotters
more im portant than eroding fundamental freedoms?
Such individual questions spring from the distinction between
the kind of expression that should be protected and the kind citizens
in a democracy may want to limit. We have recognized
conflict in
religion)

and

the inherent

the First Amendment between autonomy (freedom of
instrum ental

(free

speech)

values.

We

have

also

recognized that the framers of the Montana Constitution sought to
further clarify those values by drafting the unique right to know
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provision. The questions, then, are deceptively simple: Is it the kind
of inform ation that political theorists and the framers intended to
protect in order that discussion be more robust, the debate more
thorough, so that democracy can function more fully? Or, is it the
kind of information to which access should be limited in order to
preserve individual autonomy and privacy? If the court reflected
more carefully on this distinction, it could fashion a more consistent
sta n d a rd .
Such a focus also may help remove the clutter caused by side
arguments over public policy, efficiency and comfort. And it respects
the distinctions made by Locke, Mill, Meikeljohn, and the framers
who, in their wisdom, sought to broaden rather than lim it citizens'
access to issues and information.

Practicing the right to know

An academic analysis, which has occupied the bulk of this
thesis, is but one way to access the right to know in Montana.
Another way, which is quicker, easier, and somewhat more alarming,
is to enumerate the day-to-day problems of access encountered by
the media as they attempt to gather the news and fulfill their role as
w atchdogs

over

governm ent.

Such

an

assessm ent

reveals

that,

irrespective of political theory and Supreme Court decisions, the
press

continually

encounters closed m eetings,

lim ited access to government-held information.

sealed records

and

In

an effo rt

docum ents,

to

unlock

m eeting-room

several M ontana newspapers and

doors

and
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unseal

broadcasters joined

with the Associated Press several years ago to establish a Freedom of
Inform ation Hotline. The FOI Hotline provides a telephone number
that

reporters

and

editors

may

call

for

advice

w henever

they

encounter problems gaining access to the news. Questions about
access are fielded by attorneys for the Helena law firm of Reynolds,
M otl,

Sherwood

and

W right,

which

provides

the

service

for

a

monthly fee paid through membership dues.
AP bureau chief John Kuglin is chairman of the Montana FOI
H otline Board, and has for several years tracked, catalogued and
reported

the number and types of com plaints

from reporters and

editors throughout the state.164
In ju st the last two years, the hotline receivedl55 calls. A
rough

breakdow n

shows

reporters

and

editors

had

the

m ost

problems with access to records — 60 calls -- and closed meetings —
53 calls. Problems with access to courtrooms or with judges issuing
gag orders were a distant third — 17 calls in all.
Interview s with Kuglin and James Reynolds, an attorney and
partner in the law firm that provides hotline advice, reveal the
m ajority

of the

problem s

with

enforcem ent agencies denying

closed

records

stem

from

law

access to police blotters and jail

rosters. In other words, local police chiefs and sheriffs won't release
the names of people arrested and held in jail.

164Montana AP Wire Watch. February, 1994. The Montana FOI
Hotline News Flash. Winter, 1993.
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School districts, too, arbitrarily and commonly refuse access to
records, Kuglin said.
And despite clear rulings from the Supreme Court, city and
county commissions across the state continue to hold illegal closed
meetings, or fail to routinely publicize upcoming meetings, Reynolds
said.

Troubling, too, Reynolds

said, is

an increasingly

common

practice by commission members to gather in groups too small to
constitute a quorum, in an effort to discuss public business out of
public view. Reporters routinely complain they are

excluded from

school board meetings where personnel issues are on the docket,
Reynolds reported.
Reynolds said he has no accurate way of knowing how often
reporters are barred from records or meetings that aren't reported to
the hotline. However, he said, most — perhaps as high as 90 percent
— of the problems that do get reported are resolved on advice from
hotline attorneys.
Reynolds said he believes ignorance, rather than a desire to
skirt the law, is to blame for most of the problems. In many sparsely
populated
officials

areas

of M ontana where

are often

simply

unaware

aggressive reporting
that the

C onstitution

is rare,
or the

statutes require them to do business openly. Once advised, Reynolds
said, they usually comply.
However, a few of the Supreme Court decisions continue to
plague

reporters.

E n g ra v

is commonly used by local officials to

protect arrest records, in spite of a widely circulated opinion by the
state attorney general's office that advised local officials not to use
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the opinion to routinely shut off access to police blotters. But clearly
it's still being done.
M is s o u lia n . Reynolds said, has "closed the door" on most
evaluations of public officials, and perhaps worse, kept reporters and
editors

from

M is s o u lia n

even

challenging

such closed

proceedings.

Further,

is commonly cited when reporters request resumes or

other background

inform ation on candidates for im portant school

district or university jobs,

M is s o u lia n

"gets applied across the

board," Reynolds said.
Overall, however, Reynolds is optimistic that neither case will
prevail

in

the

long

run.

He said

he

believes

both

cases

are

"aberrations," and don’t necessarily reflect where the court is headed.
Other decisions, most notably G.F. Tribune v. Cascade County Sheriff.
suggest the court

is beginning to

view the right to privacy more

narrowly, Reynolds said. As the court continues to

struggle with the

tension between privacy and the right to know, "the right to know is
emerging as a stronger right," he concluded.
Nonetheless, a look at FOI Hotline records suggests that all
m anner of agencies and bureaucrats are easily inclined to close off
access

to

governm ent-held

inform ation.

The

resp o n sib ility

for

challenging those efforts falls largely on members of the Montana
media, since they

are the first to encounter secrecy, and are best

equipped to fight

it. But reporters and editors m ust

take it upon

them selves to educate an uninformed board chairm an, to sue an
obstinate bureaucrat, and hire the lawyers who can plead the case
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for the right to know, as articulately and vigorously as possible,
before the courts in Montana.
As John
them selves
society.

Stuart M ill once said, the dem ocratic

provide

If members

the

best remedy

of the

media

for
are

the
thus

institutions

w orst m ishiefs

in

com m itted,

if

and

Reynold's optimism is warranted, then the M ontana right to know
provision can afford far better protection for those citizens who truly
"do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which
serve them."

Addendum
In December 1993, the Montana Supreme Court ruled in a case
out

of Billings that a reporter can be

excluded from a meeting

between city employees and a private contractor w ithout violating
the

Open

M eetings Law

or

Art. II,

Sec.

9

of

the

M ontana

C o nstitu tio n .165
The facts are these:

In May 1992, a reporter from KTVQ

television learned of a scheduled meeting between two Billings city
employees — the city engineer and the director of public works —
and

two private contractors

m eeting

was

surrounding

to

discuss

p roperty

working on
construction

ow ners

b etter

a local street project. The
delays

and

inform ed

how

of

to

keep

co n stru ction

problems. The reporter was barred because it was a "staff meeting,"
and because the firms requested the media be excluded.
KTVQ sued in District Court and won its argument that it had a
constitutional right to attend the meeting. The city appealed and the
Supreme Court reversed. In its decision, the court said:
1. The meeting was not a "staff meeting," as the city alleged,
because the private firms were not part of the city staff.
2. The state Open Meetings Law would require the meeting

be

open only if it could be determined it was a meeting of a "public
agency."

165KTVO v. Citv of Billings. No. 92-449 (Mont. 1993). NOTE: This
case was concluded as the final touches were put on this thesis. It is
an important case and deserves inclusion, however, it does not shift
the focus of this report, nor change its conclusions.
97

98
3.

Based

on

interpretations

of

the

Open

M eetings

transcripts of the Constitutional Convention debates, and prior cases,
the two city employees did not constitute "governmental agencies" or
"public

agencies"

since

neither

"had

rule-m aking

authority

and

regulatory powers." Therefore, there is no constitutional requirem ent
the meeting be open.
Five justices signed the majority opinion; two justices joined in
a dissent.
Sadly, this ruling fits with several of the court’s worst opinions
on the right to know. The court seemingly went searching for
evidence to redefine a public servant — in this case, as someone who
does n o t

act on behalf of the agency he works for. In so doing, the

court also invented another way to allow

government officials to

retreat to the comfort and seclusion of secret meetings.
Justice Triew eiler in his dissent picked apart the m ajority
opinion, pointing out that the court itself ruled only months earlier in
Great Falls Tribune v. Great Falls Public Schools that "The language of
[Article II, Section 9] speaks for itself. It applies to all persons and all
public bodies of the state and its subdivisions w ith o u t

exception

(em phasis added)."
Trieweiler also hinted at the court’s occasional predilection to
let public policy arguments outweigh the plain interpretation of the
law. Simply, he wrote, there can be no "public policy reason" to deny
the media access to such meetings.
Finally, Trieweiler rightly concluded this ruling "is a substantial
blow

to

the

p u b lic’s right

to

know

guaranteed

by

our

State

Law,
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Constitution. It allows public agencies and their officers to conduct
public business in secret and without public scrutiny. This is not in
the public's interest and is exactly what our constitutional right to
know was designed to prevent."
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